IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT: POTENTIAL FOR SPILLOVER IN THE BALKANS

JULY 21, 1993

Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
[CSCE 103-1-8]

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(III)
THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT: POTENTIAL FOR SPILLOVER IN THE BALKANS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 21, 1993.

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Washington, DC.

The Commission met at 2 p.m., in room 628 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman, presiding.

Present: Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman; Representative Steny H. Hoyer, Co-Chairman; Commissioners Representatives Frank McCloskey, Benjamin Cardin, Frank Wolf, Hamilton Fish, Senators Charles Grassley, and Connie Mack.

Also present: Representatives John W. Olver and Helen Bentley.

Chairman DeCONCINI. The Commission on Security and Cooperation will come to order. The Helsinki Commission has convened this hearing to take a more thorough look at the potential spillover effect of the Yugoslav conflict, which today is characterized mostly by the aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In doing so, I hope that we and our distinguished witnesses can discuss three important aspects of the issue.

First, direct spillover. What are the risks of fighting erupting in areas neighboring or close to Bosnia-Herzegovina? The most likely candidates are the UN protected areas of Croatia, still occupied by Serb militants, the Muslim-inhabited Sandzak region of Serbia and Montenegro, and the Albanian-inhabited Kosovo, and of course, Macedonia. The eruption of violence in these and other areas could be either premeditated or spontaneous and could also potentially trigger the involvement of other countries within this region.

Secondly, the broader impact of Yugoslavia's violent disintegration on the Balkans. Economically, it has severely disrupted transport, created a massive refugee problem, and by the need to impose sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, caused some neighboring countries additional economic hardship during the critical time of reform. Socially, aspects of the Yugoslav conflict and crisis are the preoccupation of many neighboring societies, and in all likelihood have encouraged nationalism and ethnic tensions among them as well.

Third, why should we care about either direct spillover or the broader impact? While the fact that genocide is taking place morally and legally obligates us to become involved, it is important to know what U.S. interests in the Balkans are, and how vital these interests are considered to be. If the conflict does spread, how will these interests be affected? What does the current international
policy, a lot of motion but little real action, mean to the future of the NATO Alliance? What does it mean for new global balances in the post-Cold War world?

Our witnesses today will address these important questions. First, we have Stephen Oxman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, who can explain current U.S. policies and what we and the Europeans are doing to contain the conflict through the CSCE or otherwise. We also hope to hear a description of U.S. interests in the Balkan region as seen by the Clinton Administration.

Before Mr. Oxman proceeds, I will yield to the distinguished co-chairman of the Commission who has just come back from Helsinki, by the way. My compliments for his aggressive action over there as usual on behalf of human rights.

Congressman Hoyer?

Co-Chairman Hoyer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that my statement be included in the record in full at this time.

Chairman DeConcini. Without objection.

Co-Chairman Hoyer. I will just make a brief statement, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Warnke, one of our most distinguished Americans.

The world has watched, in my opinion, while we have returned to a barbaric confrontation between populations, among ethnic groups and nationalities. And the promise of the new world order, in my opinion, is going to be lost if we do not come to grips with the creation of a collective security system which does not allow the carnage that we see occurring in Yugoslavia, to occur within the international community. I frankly think the former Administration was far too reticent at a time when it would have been, perhaps, more effective to act.

But more so than that, I think the European Community and others, have failed at their responsibility to participate effectively in stabilizing Europe and preventing international—or even if one looks at it as somewhat akin to a civil war, as I know some Europeans do, a premise I reject, Holocaust-like actions and the creation of more refugees than we have seen since the end of World War II.

Mr. Secretary and other witnesses, I believe we've got to come to grips with that. This hearing is obviously focused on whether or not there will be a spillover effect if we don't. My own view is that there will be. My own view is that what is happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina will not stop there, whoever would fall. And that Macedonia and Kosovo, other areas are not only vulnerable but probable for future violence.

So, Mr. Chairman, I'm very pleased to join you this morning. I think these hearings are very important. I appreciate your calling them. I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses.

Chairman DeConcini. Thank you very much, Congressman Hoyer, and I'm going to put the balance of my statement in the record.

I want to welcome the Congressman from Indiana, the newest member on the Commission. We welcome you here, Mr. McCloskey, and yield to you for an opening statement.

Representative McCloskey. Thank you, Senator.
I just want to say thank you very much. You're both great leaders and wonderful friends. It's an honor to be on the Committee. I'm looking forward to hearing from the witnesses and look forward to working with these Senators. Thank you.

Chairman DeConcini. We'll give you ten minutes to stop saying those kind things.

The Senator from Iowa?

Senator Grassley. I have no opening statement, Mr. Chairman. Chairman DeConcini. And we welcome the distinguished Representative from Maryland, Ms. Bentley. Do you have any opening statement?

Representative Bentley. No, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to thank you for holding this hearing.

Chairman DeConcini. And the Senator from Florida, Senator Mack?

[Senator Mack indicated he had no opening statement.]

Chairman DeConcini. Very good.

Mr. Oxman, if you would please summarize your statement, please, and proceed?

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN A. OXMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS

Secretary Oxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today and to talk about the impact of the crisis in the Balkans.

As you know, the prevention of a wider Balkan war has been one of this Administration's principal goals. I've submitted a written statement for the record. I'd simply like to summarize it here if I could. Let me comment first on some of the ways in which the present conflict has spread, and why a wider conflict could affect our interests. Second, what steps we're taking and what the international community is doing to prevent the spread. And finally, what we're doing to encourage the broader trends towards democracy and free markets in the region.

The potential for spillover flows from the ethnic geography of the Balkans. The Balkan nations are not homogeneous. They contain intermingled ethnic, religious, and national groups. There are Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia, as well as in Serbia. There are Hungarians in Serbia and Romania. There are Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia, and I could give many more examples.

This ethnic tinderbox can ignite if political leaders fan the flames of nationalism. We believe that the rights of national minorities must be protected and respected, and we oppose any attempts to change national borders by force. But our policy must take account of the powerful emotional impact of calls for ethnic solidarity.

Let me give you an update on the situations where the conflict might spread. First, Croatia. In Croatia, a more intense conflict could break out between the Croatian government and the Croatian Serbs in the Krajina, who now control approximately 25 percent of that country. The international community has been trying to mediate, but without much success to date, although last weekend, international mediation did help to defuse, at least for the moment, a potential crisis when the Croatian government rebuilt the
Maslenica bridge. The situation remains extremely tense and widespread fighting could erupt at any time.

With respect to Kosovo and Macedonia. Our principal concern in Kosovo is that the Serbian government might crack down violently, either in furtherance of a program of “ethnic cleansing,” or in reaction to actions by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Fighting could also be generating by extremist Serb nationalist groups which have bases of operations in Kosovo. This violence could lead to a flow of refugees into Macedonia, upsetting and destabilizing that country. Fighting in Kosovo might also spread to Macedonia and Albania if combatants retreat or seek refuge across the border in those countries, or if ethnic Albanians from the region seek to aid their brethren in Kosovo.

Finally, we can not discount the possibility of a Serb invasion of Macedonia on the pretext of protecting the Serb minority there. We do not, at this time, believe that violence in Kosovo is imminent, but an unexpected incident could trigger an explosion at any time.

With respect to Sandjak and Vojvodina. They are less immediately explosive than Kosovo and Croatia. Minority populations in both regions have been subjected to Serb harassment and intimidation, but not on a wide scale. In both regions, we are concerned that the present activities are merely a prelude to a more aggressive campaign of ethnic cleansing.

Any of these situations has the potential to lead to a wider conflict that could more broadly affect European security and American interests in a variety of ways. First, refugees may flee from wider violence to neighboring states. Already, there are over 2.5 million refugees from the countries of former Yugoslavia. A new flood would strain the limited resources of the Balkan states and could have a destabilizing influence.

Second, neighboring states may be drawn in to protect their ethnic brethren, or may be tempted to take advantage of the tumult to press territorial claims. Broader fighting in the region, which includes two of our NATO allies, would be extremely dangerous for European security.

Third, a widening of the conflict might deal a death blow to the Balkan nations that are currently trying to make the difficult transition to multi-ethnic democratic states. If we are unable to prevent a wider conflict, would-be aggressors, bigots and extreme nationalists will be encouraged to foment violence in other areas, and the credibility of the U.S. and the international community could be damaged.

Because of these dangers, the U.S., acting unilaterally and through international organizations such as the UN and the CSCE, has acted on several fronts to prevent spillover.

In Kosovo, we called upon the Serb authorities to stop repression of the Albanian minority, to avoid the use of force, and to restore the region’s autonomy. We have also met with Doctor Rugova, the Albanian Kosovo leader whom I know some of you have met with as well, to reinforce our publicly stated opposition to full independence for Kosovo.

We are providing humanitarian aid to Kosovo. We have warned Mr. Milosevic that we are prepared to respond to conflict in Kosovo caused by Serb action. We have inspired, supported, and partici-
pated in the CSCE long duration missions in Kosovo, Sandzak, and Vojvodina. As you know, in the joint action program which we agreed here in Washington in May, we along with the other Security Council members who were signatories, called for an increase in the number of monitors. Unfortunately, the Serbian government has recently indicated that it will terminate the mission.

You are probably aware that Secretary Christopher sent a very strong message to Mr. Milosevic, telling him that we viewed his failure to extend the mission with the utmost seriousness. Others, including Russia, the EC, and the CSCE, pressed for the mission's extension. This morning, I learned that the Serbian government has rejected these requests and has refused to extend the mission except upon conditions that we deem entirely unacceptable.

We deplore this action by the Serbian government, which we believe increases the risk of wider conflict in the region. We are working with the CSCE to bring this matter before the UN Security Council. We and the CSCE are looking for other ways to monitor the region.

With respect to Macedonia. Several weeks ago, I had the privilege of briefing the Congress on the President's decision to offer U.S. forces to augment the UN contingent in Macedonia. Deployment of our troops, approximately 330 American soldiers, is now complete.

After a month of training, our troops will be rotated periodically to the border between Macedonia and Kosovo, to monitor the border for destabilizing activity, and to watch for sanctions violations. Their presence will send a signal of our commitment to contain the present conflict.

With respect to Croatia, approximately 13,000 UN peacekeeping troops have been in place since mid-1992. While they have been unable to stop the fighting completely, or to bring about a peaceful return to Croatia, a peaceful return of Croatian authority in the territories held by the Croatian Serbs, they have succeeded in limiting the fighting to some extent.

Finally, we are encouraging the parties to the Bosnia conflict to reach a negotiated settlement. Such a settlement agreed upon by all the parties, is the best way to end the conflict and prevent it from spreading.

As you noted in announcing this hearing, the Yugoslav conflict has already had "a major impact in other Balkan countries, economically, politically and socially." The conflict in Bosnia encourages the voices of intolerance and reaction throughout the region. A wider conflict would endanger the new democracies when they are most vulnerable.

The economic impact of the Yugoslav conflict upon the already fragile economies in the region, has been severe. Among other matters the war has frightened away needed foreign investment. And enforcement of the U.S. sanctions against Serbia has deprived the Balkan democracies of traditional export markets and isolated them in varying degrees, both from each other and from new markets they are trying to develop in Western Europe.

We are supporting the sanctions enforcement efforts of the frontline states through the operation of the Sanctions Assistance Missions under auspices of the CSCE and the European Community.
These missions give us the ability to monitor and improve sanctions enforcement.

The picture in the region up to this point is very gloomy, but let me say, the overall picture in the region is not entirely gloomy. The Balkan democracies remind us that democratic institutions are the best means to channel ethnic, religious, and other conflicts into the political progress. They demonstrate that democratic values and institutions can take root and flourish, even in places where conventional wisdom discounts their prospects. And they provide evidence that democratic development internally can promote cooperative regional relations, even among historic adversaries.

Therefore, the foundation of our policy in the Balkans must be to support the continued development of democratic institutions, free market economies, and open societies, and ultimately, to integrate these nations into a European security system. In the immediate future, we intend to foster democratic development in the region through the following mutually reinforcing means.

We will maintain our engagement and dialogue with the Balkan democracies, both bilaterally and through the CSCE. We will work to increase U.S. and European trade with and investment in the Balkan countries. The Administration has proposed that Romania be granted Most Favored Nation status, an important step in helping that country's economy. We will promote economic ties among the Balkan democracies, and between them and the West.

Through cultural and educational exchanges and by working with non-governmental groups, we hope to mobilize the strong interest and resources present at the grass roots in American, to link the U.S. and the Balkans together.

Finally, we will continue to use our assistance programs to support our goals in the region. Our principal means of helping the Balkan democracies is the support for Eastern European Democracies Act, the SEED Act. Since the Congress passed the SEED Act in 1989, we have provided over $150 million to Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, and some countries of the former Yugoslavia, to assist them in developing democratic institutions, changing to free market economies, and improving the quality of life. My written remarks provide some examples of what we have done in that regard.

We must continue the SEED program to help these countries in future years. And we must also encourage our European allies to do their part in providing aid and opening markets to the countries of this region. These policies can advance our goal of bringing long-term stability to the Balkans. The best vaccine against the plague of war is prosperity and democracy.

I want to underscore the Administration's conviction that the Balkans tomorrow need not look like Bosnia today. Working together with international organizations, we hope to contain the present conflict so as to permit the forces of moderation to triumph throughout the region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman. I'd be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Chairman DeCONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I'm going to limit questions on one round each here, to ten minutes, including myself. I'll ask one of the staff here to hand us a one minute notification.
Thank you, Secretary, very much. You make reference to ethnic solidarity. You mean ethnic cleansing as it is termed? I presume that's what you're referring to?

Secretary Oxman. Right.

Chairman DeConcini. Relating to Kosovo, Mr. Secretary, you said the United States has made it very clear to Mr. Milosevic that we will respond. What have we told Mr. Milosevic, and in what manner will we respond? I've read some in the press, but I wondered what the Administration's actual, specific response, if any, has been. Will we respond with force?

Secretary Oxman. Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to respond—what I'm referring to is that there is the so-called Christmas demarche that was made by the prior Administration, which we reaffirmed on February 11, and reaffirmed again recently.

With respect to the details of that and of what we would be prepared to do to respond, I would prefer not to discuss that in open session, if you would permit, Mr. Chairman. But I think what we have said is very, very clear. In the event of Serb-inspired conflict in Kosovo, the United States will be prepared to respond.

Chairman DeConcini. Well, if it isn't for public purposes, has it been conveyed to Mr. Milosevic in specifics?

Secretary Oxman. It has been conveyed to Mr. Milosevic and I don't think he's in any doubt as to our intention.

Chairman DeConcini. Well, I can read between the lines, but I would like to know what it is, specifically, either through this Commission at a closed session to which other members would be invited.

Mr. Secretary, do you truly believe that messages sent to Mr. Milosevic from the United States, or the CSCE regarding the CSCE missions in Kosovo, Sandzak, and Vojvodina—do you think he takes them seriously at all when there seems to be no reins on Mr. Milosevic and no action is really taken by the community-at-large except with the sanctions? What makes us believe these messages are worth sending? Or is that just something that we have to do?

Secretary Oxman. Well, that's a very good question, Mr. Chairman. We are very disappointed in the result of the recent message that we sent, which was a strong statement.

Chairman DeConcini. On the CSCE mission?

Secretary Oxman. On the CSCE mission in Kosovo, in particular. Our ability to monitor the situation in Kosovo is dependent upon having eyes and ears on the ground. As you know, from your own trip to the region, the CSCE monitors perform an extremely valuable function.

Chairman DeConcini. Indeed, they do.

Secretary Oxman. Mr. Milosevic himself has conceded that they perform a valuable function. The fact that despite our strong request, he has decided to expel monitors and terminate their mission is—

Chairman DeConcini. As of what date is that, do you remember?

Secretary Oxman [continuing]. So far as I understand it, the visas of the remaining monitors in Kosovo expire at the end of this week. The message that we got was a response to the CSCE Chairman-in-Office's letter to him. The response was dated yesterday
from the government. Not from Mr. Milosevic himself, but from his government.

So, that's obviously a great disappointment. Our ability to monitor the situation will be impeded. We will consider other ways of doing so, but Kosovo, as you know, is part of Serbia and we need the consent of the government there before we can have people on the ground.

As you may know, Mr. Chairman, the pretexts given for the expulsion of the monitors by the government of Serbia is that they want to first normalize their relations with the CSCE before they will consent to the extension of the mandate for the monitors. Serbia and Montenegro are essentially on a probationary type of status, as I understand it, within the CSCE and for good reason, in my judgment.

Chairman DeConcini. I agree with that.

Secretary Oxman. They are seeking to link the normalization of their relations with the CSCE with the continued presence of the monitors in Kosovo. We consider that unacceptable, and so does the international community. We have consulted with our allies. We've consulted within the CSCE, and there's essentially a unanimous view that there should be no linkage of this kind.

With respect to whether it's worth making our views known? Yes, I think it was worth making our views known. I know that he received our message. His judgment as to how to react is, I think, very, very unfortunate. We deplore the expulsion of the monitors.

Chairman DeConcini. What will we do about it, anything else?

Secretary Oxman. Pardon me, sir?

Chairman DeConcini. Will we take any other action? Is other action being considered?

Secretary Oxman. We are considering other ways to monitor the situation. And again, I'd prefer not to go into that in open session at this time, but there may be other ways that we can do our best to stay abreast of the situation on the ground.

As to further steps, the CSCE Chairman-in-Office has today referred the matter to the UN Security Council. She has communicated with the President of the Security Council and the matter will be coming before the Security Council. So, it will get attention at that higher level.

Chairman DeConcini. Mr. Oxman, is there evidence to indicate that the Croatian government and Mr. Tudjman himself, are supporting the ethnic cleansing that is occurring in the western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina today and in the past several weeks?

Secretary Oxman. There is evidence that the Croatian government is providing support through the activities of the Bosnian-Serb, Bosnian-Croat forces in that region. There is also evidence that——

Chairman DeConcini. Including the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population that's been reported in the press?

Secretary Oxman [continuing]. Including the ethnic cleansing. There's also evidence that the Bosnian-Croat forces are coordinating closely with the Bosnian-Serb forces against the Bosnian government forces. So, there is evidence of that, yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman DeConcini. Thank you. My time is up.
Congressman Hoyer?
Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I understand the private communication. What would lead Milosevic to believe that we're serious?
Secretary OXMAN. Again, it's hard to put yourself inside someone else's thinking. I think the fact that we made the strong warning that I mentioned earlier, and the fact that, thus far at least, there has not been action by the Serbs to ethnically cleanse in a proactive way in Kosovo or to stimulate conflict in Kosovo, my judgment is they got the message.
With respect to other matters, I think they're getting the message very, very much with respect to the sanctions. Obviously, we all know sanctions take a while to have an effect. They are having an extremely severe effect in Serbia, with 60- plus percent unemployment, with inflation running recently at over 350 percent per month, with industrial production down over 30 percent. We know this is causing severe pain in Serbia, and I think he's getting that part of the message.
On the other hand, he takes actions which are very much inconsistent with his expressed views. He stated that he would close the border between Bosnia and Serbia after the Athens Agreement on, I believe it was May 2nd. And that he would permit the international community to station monitors along the border. He has completely reneged on that undertaking, and I would say we were not surprised by the reneging. But I think it's a point to be made that it was a complete reneging.
He indicated that he thought the presence of the monitors in Kosovo was a valuable thing. A valuable function was being served, and yet, he is permitting their expulsion with all that that entails.
Co-Chairman HOYER. Mr. Secretary, let me pursue, just one minute, the sanctions. What action, if any, are we taking with respect to those European nations that are not honoring the closed borders?
Secretary OXMAN. The sanctions enforcement effort is an extensive and complicated exercise. The sanctions enforcement with respect to Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria is actually quite tight and has improved. This is, in large measure, due to the work of the CSCE sanctions assistance missions which are jointly sponsored, as you know, by the European Community. And in large measure, due to the good work of Leon Fuerth here in our Executive Branch, who has been, really, the point man, in many ways, within the Administration on this.
The situation with respect to Macedonia is not satisfactory in terms of sanctions enforcement, as you know from your own work. That border needs to be tightened up very, very considerably. We have taken steps recently to try and do that. We have been working with the Greek government to establish a system of pre-certification of oil shipments going from Greece into Macedonia to try to assure that they go to Macedonia, but not onward into Serbia.
We are working under the existing UNPROFOR mandate to try and do the maximum that can be done under that existing mandate, so the UNPROFOR troops can assist as much as possible in the sanctions monitoring and enforcement effort on that border. And that may not be enough. I think an issue that needs to be con-
sidered and that we are considering is whether there is a role that
the UNPROFOR troops, which now include our own American sol-
diers, can play in this regard. A more—role that can be played with
respect to sanctions enforcement along that border.
Co-Chairman HOYER. Mr. Secretary, let me stop you.
One of the complaints we've heard, as I'm sure you know because
I'm sure you've heard them as well, is that the UNPROFOR force
perceives its mandate as very limited and very constrained. Are
they, in fact, participating in sanction enforcement? And when you
mention Macedonia, I presume the goods are coming through
Greece into Macedonia?
Secretary OXMAN. And through Bulgaria and Greece.
Co-Chairman HOYER. But Bulgaria, am I correct, is not nearly as
porous?
Secretary OXMAN. That's correct. That's correct.
Co-Chairman HOYER. What is the Greek position with respect to
the sanctions?
Secretary OXMAN. The Greeks' position is that they support the
sanctions and are cooperating to increase the enforcement.
Co-Chairman HOYER. And in our judgment, are they?
Secretary OXMAN. In our judgment, they are cooperating and
they've agreed to cooperate on this new initiative. But I think, can-
didly, there's a lot more that needs to be done. The border is too
porous between Macedonia and Serbia. We need to do more.
Co-Chairman HOYER. And back to my original focus, the
UNPROFOR force. To what degree do the troops there—whether
it's the Scandinavian troops or others—feel that part of their man-
date is to, in fact, take any action with respect to enforcement of
sanctions?
Secretary OXMAN. The UNPROFOR troops are informally assist-
ing in sanctions monitoring, I think is the best way to characterize
it now. Under the resolution which authorizes the presence of those
troops in Macedonia, there is not authorization for actual participa-
tion in sanctions enforcement, or actually impeding the flow of
goods.
So, at the present time—and this was brought home to me in a
hearing before Senator Levin and Senator Warner recently, where
they had a very large picture you may have seen when they were
up at the border. They had the picture blown up of the trucks wait-
ing in line on the Macedonia side of the border. And the only thing
that was slowing them down was that the Serbs' custom officials
on the other side couldn't function quite rapidly enough. And they
ask, I think, quite rightly, "can't something be done about this situa-
tion?"
The UNPROFOR troops that are there now are assisting in moni-
toring and counting and creating a record, as to the violations.
That's helpful to create the record, but to create it toward what
end? The fact is that, as I understand it, before the UNPROFOR
troops could participate more robustly in sanctions monitoring or
enforcement, there would need to be new authority with a Security
Council resolution. That is being considered at the present time.
But the current posture is, let's maximize what can be done
under the existing authority. Let's see if that process of creating
the record has its own in terrorem effect which diminishes the flow.
Let's work on the Greek pre-certification, and then, let's address the question of whether additional authority would be needed. But I think it is a very important issue.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Because our time is brief, I won't be as consistent in my line of questioning as I would like to be. Let me jump to another subject quickly.

The arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina, what is the present position of the United States with reference to that arms embargo?

Secretary OXMAN. Our position has remained the same, that we have viewed this as the preferred approach because the embargo has had the unintended consequence of freezing in place a very gross disparity in armament, over ten-to-one in heavy weapons.

As you know, we sought to gain agreement on this because to lift the embargo does require Security Council action. We were not able to gain agreement and that is still the posture. There is not agreement. We are pursuing the other approaches that I've described here, and that were set out in the Joint Action Program of May 22nd.

Co-Chairman HOYER. I have one additional minute, I'm told. So, let me go to another issue. And we also have a vote on. Hopefully, the House members will vote and then come back.

Mr. Secretary, what is our present policy with respect to the granting of visas to other than Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina? You look puzzled.

Secretary OXMAN. Yes.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Our staff, has received information that the only group being granted entry visas from Bosnia-Herzegovina are Muslims. In particular, we have Catholic constituents who have contacted us—not necessarily my personal constituents—regarding the policy of this government, that we are extending entry authority only to Muslims?

Secretary OXMAN. I'll be happy to get back to you on that.

Co-Chairman HOYER. I'll pursue it then and we can look at specific cases as well.

Secretary OXMAN. I'll be happy to get back to you on that.

Co-Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll go vote.

Chairman DECONCINI. Senator from Iowa?

Senator GRASSLEY. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that our troops in Macedonia do not face imminent hostilities. If I remember right, that term “imminent hostilities” is what triggered in the War Powers Act.

What exactly do you mean in this instance? And our troops in any particular danger at this point? What’s your definition of “imminent hostilities”?

Secretary OXMAN. This was with respect to Macedonia? Senator, I'm sorry, I didn't get the first part of your question.

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes.

Secretary OXMAN. The troops in Macedonia are joining the Nordic battalion, which is already there. About 700 troops that have been there since early this year. Our troops are an augmentation of the UNPROFOR presence, so they're there under an UNPROFOR rubric.

There have not been hostilities in Macedonia, or even at the border. The function is more one of monitoring for signs of instability,
and also, the great importance of having the symbolic presence of American troops. So, that’s the situation on the ground.

With respect to the definition of imminent hostilities, I don’t have one right at the tip of my tongue or any—definition—

Senator GRASSLEY. I think that answers my question. You weren’t intending then to take words out of the War Powers Act?

Secretary OXMAN [continuing]. No, I wasn’t. I wasn’t. With respect to the War Powers Act—

Senator GRASSLEY. On the other hand, if that is the way that the term is being used by the government, then I think we ought to know that.

Secretary OXMAN [continuing]. With respect to the War Powers Act, I think I would simply say that an analysis was done before we offered to make these troops available to UNPROFOR. It was the legal judgment that was rendered to us that—I can’t remember whether we made it a notification, to tell you the truth, but we were advised by whatever the recommendation was, as to doing whatever was necessary under the War Powers Act at the time.

Senator GRASSLEY. If the CSCE mission is not extended, what are the options that you are considering to monitor the situation?

Secretary OXMAN. Again, I hesitate to get into too much detail, but there may be other ways to achieve the result of understanding what is happening on the ground, being able to report on what is happening, having some type of a eyes-and-ears. But given the preliminary stage of what we’re considering, Senator, and the nature of it, I would prefer if you would permit me not to address that specifically in open session at this time.

Senator GRASSLEY. OK. But obviously, I think it’s very clear, if you can’t give specifics—and I can appreciate that. I hope you’re trying to at least tell me you do have in-depth plans in place of what to do in that particular instance?

Secretary OXMAN. We have—

Senator GRASSLEY. I mean, I hope you can at least assure me of that.

Secretary OXMAN [continuing]. We have some specific ideas that we are analyzing and considering for what to do if, in fact, the mission is expelled. Which it looks like it will be because the visas expire at the end of the week. Although, as I say, the matter has gone to the UN Security Council today, and we’re looking at a number of approaches. I’d be happy to talk to you further about them. I would say they are in the analysis phase.

Senator GRASSLEY. Would they be things that you would expect to put into motion almost immediately when this present process ends or is there—

Secretary OXMAN. I think we should move promptly, yes.

Senator GRASSLEY [continuing]. Yes, OK.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman DECONCINI. The Senator from Florida, Mr. Mack?

Senator MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just give you, maybe a personal impression that I think represents fairly what a lot of people in this country believe, and I think internationally as well.

While we still maintain the position of lifting the embargo and using air strikes as our position, clearly, the message that has been
sent is that we're not really prepared to do that. We have, in essence, acquiesced to the position of our allies. And as a result, we continue to see pictures on television, as I'm sure all of us saw over the last week or so, with respect to those young children that were left behind in a hospital. And I use that word advisedly.

The situation is just getting worse and worse. And it seems like while we're saying the right kind of things, that the reality is that we have just kind of washed our hands of the conflict in Bosnia. And in some respects, the sending of the 300 troops into Macedonia indicates that we're now saying we're now prepared to use that as the break point in which we will become involved.

I think that the points that have been raised here today are really saying that despite all these messages of strong talk and how we're going to react, there are real questions in people's minds as to whether, in fact, we are prepared to back our words with actions. I, for one, find that terribly discouraging. I would think that the message that we are sending, contrary to what we're saying, is one of weakness.

That, maybe, is not directed at the Administration only, but a sense of weakness on the part of the free world. That our nations, the peoples of our societies, are not prepared to step forward and do what is necessary. I think that has tremendous ramifications beyond the conflict that's taking place in Bosnia.

And I guess my last point is not much of a question, but just a point. I think that Milosevic is just biding his time with respect to Kosovo. He'll do what he wants to do in Bosnia. When that's through, he's got to come to a conclusion in his mind that if the free world did not react under those circumstances, certainly, they're not going to get involved in Kosovo.

I would be interested in your reactions to that kind of thinking. Again, I was not trying to do that as an attack on the Administration. It would be easy to do so. But I think it's a recognition of the fact that it's not just the failure on the part of the United States to act, but the Western World.

Secretary Oxman. Well, I appreciate the spirit of your question. I would break it into two parts. I would say with respect to the external situation, I think we've made it very clear that we're absolutely determined to prevent spillover. I think the actions we've taken, both with respect to the warning I referred to earlier and with respect to the deployment of the troops, are indicative of the fact that we're determined to prevent spillover.

With respect to the internal situation, which is enormously tragic and enormously complex. I share both of those feelings that you expressed. We have not washed our hands of the situation. I think that is not the way I would characterize it at all. We have an enormously complex situation which we, in this Administration, came upon in mid-stream, as it were. We've been quite activist on a number of fronts.

We initiated the air drops, of which there now have been over 300 missions, almost 10 million meals that we dropped. We took the lead in getting NATO to be enforcing the no-fly zone.

Senator Mack. Mr. Secretary, let me just interrupt for a second. Secretary Oxman. Yes.
Senator Mack. I don't discount either the importance from a humanitarian standpoint, of doing that. But it seems to me that in order to have a credible diplomatic initiative, that there has to be a belief on those that you're negotiating with that there's a willingness to use force, if necessary.

And to be just a little more critical at this point of the Administration, and specifically, of the President. If he—if our nation is going to become involved, it is going to take the leadership of the President for that occur. He must, in fact, be the voice of concern for our fellow man in our society, if it is going to become a major issue and a major initiative. So, again, I think that the United States has failed in its leadership role, and I think it is going to require a greater participation on the part of the President to make the case as far as the role that the United States should play.

Now, to restate a couple of other points. That was the message that I tried to give to Secretary Aspin when he was going through his confirmation hearings. The message that has come out of this Administration is that the best foreign policy is a strong domestic policy. And while I think all of us understand the significance and the importance of having a strong economy in the United States, we can't constantly be saying to the world that America is interested in America first, at the same time that we're drawing down our military capability and that we are timid about using our limited capability. I think the job of the diplomats of this nation is incredibly difficult under those circumstances.

Secretary Oxman. Thank you. I appreciate your comment.

I think what that gets down to, perhaps, is the question of why hasn't the United States deployed ground troops? We've done a lot. We have not deployed ground troops and it's not contemplated that we would. We view this as a matter that the parties themselves need to decide and to negotiate. We do not view it—have not contemplated that it would be appropriate to commit United States ground troops to Bosnia. When you look at all the other things we've done, I think it's fair to say we've been quite forward-leaning and quite activist.

With respect to the committing of ground troops, that's a very, very serious matter and it requires analysis of what is the objective? What is the likelihood of achieving it? What's the likelihood of getting out? And the judgment has been made that we do not contemplate the deployment of ground troops. It does mean that the situation on the ground in Bosnia is unsatisfactory. There's no two ways about it. The fighting continues. There is a disparity in armaments which we did try, with a very aggressive diplomatic posture, to remedy. We were very robust in that regard, diplomatically.

Senator Mack. Mr. Secretary, let me——

Secretary Oxman. That would have helped create counter-pressure on the ground, lifting that embargo.

Senator Mack [continuing]. I have not raised the issue of ground troops.

The briefing that we had earlier this year, as Secretary Christopher was in Europe trying to gain support of our allies, was the most confused statement of objectives, of policy, that this Senator
has heard in the 11 years that I have been a member of the Con-
gress.
My point is, if the same message that was delivered to us in
those briefings was the message we were trying to get our allies
to agree to, it is not hard for me to understand why Secretary
Christopher was unable to get our allies to agree to support those
positions.
Secretary Oxman. Well, could I comment on that? I was on the
trip, so I don’t know about the briefing.
The message was very, very clear that we gave. We explained
the reasoning behind wanting to lift the arms embargo. It had to do
with the disparity of power on the ground because of the freezing
in of the disparity in heavy weapons, and the need to create
counter-pressure on the ground in aid of a negotiated solution. I
think the argument for lifting the arms embargo is quite compel-
ling.
The arguments against it, which our allies raised, had to do with
the fact that they had troops on the ground, and their concern
about the effect of lifting the arms embargo on the humanitarian
effort. And those are debatable points. We felt that those points
could be dealt with. They were of the view that they could not, but
there was nothing really unclear about that. And I think the policy
objective expressed was quite clear. I think it’s consistent with, per-
haps, the assumption in your question that there’s a need to create
more pressure—counter-pressure on the ground there.
Senator Mack. I’ll just close my time here with saying to the
Chairman, I would be very much interested in the follow-on about
how we’re going to monitor what is going on in Kosovo. I traveled
there in 1990 and the circumstances—I took your words down here
that Serbia “might crackdown violently” at some point in Kosovo.
Having seen what was going on in 1990, really, I have deep con-
cerns about what’s going to happen in Kosovo. And so, I would be
very much interested in what the follow-on is going to be.
Secretary Oxman. Efforts to provide monitoring of the political
situation in the Serbian regions of Kosovo, Sandzak, and Vojvodina
are proceeding on two tracks.
First, the CSCE continues to be actively engaged in monitoring
the regions through embassies of CSCE nations Belgrade. Those
embassies have met to coordinate a strategy that will provide for emb-
sassy officers to travel regularly to the regions to gauge the level
of tension and to meet with interlocutors of the CSCE monitors. Also,
a CSCE Standing Group in Vienna is monitoring the situa-
tion and coordinating the CSCE’s responses.
Second, there has been a suggestion that the International Con-
ference on the former Yugoslavia sponsor monitoring missions in
the regions. That is being reviewed with the EC.
The United States is also following the situation in Kosovo on a
bilateral basis through its embassy in Belgrade.
Chairman DeConcini. I thank the Senator. And having just been
there in April myself, in Kosovo, I have the same concerns. So, I’m
interested in having an executive briefing and I’d be glad to make
it available to the Senator from Florida.
Representative McCloskey?
Representative McCloskey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Good to see you again, Mr. Oxman.
Secretary Oxman. Thank you, sir.
Representative McCloskey. This hearing today is basically concerned about spillover. This implies "beyond Bosnia." If I'm not mistaken, the term Sarajevo has hardly been mentioned, either in your opening statement or the general discussion, and I've been here for the whole meeting.

What is the bottom line for Sarajevo? It's been under sporadic and sometimes massive seige for the last 17 months, with tens of thousands of people killed. It's not unlikely that the entire city could be destroyed. Tens of thousands or more will die and there will be further refugees in the area.

Do we have a bottom line on Sarajevo, Mr. Oxman? I went to the region and talked to General Gudreau, the Deputy Commander of UNPROFOR in Zagreb a couple of weeks ago. He said Western air strikes on Sarajevo was needed. I heard a similar statement from the Belgian Foreign Minister and members of his delegation the other day. Have we written that option off? I have seen hardly a mention of it from State or the Administration in general, in recent days.

Secretary Oxman. We have not written that off, Congressman, at all. We're aware that the situation in Sarajevo is worsening and it's a source of deep concern. The airlift of supplies into the city is continuing and we are participating in that. The United States has flown over 1,000 missions into Sarajevo.

One of the most serious problems, as you know, is the water situation in Sarajevo. In coordination with our Defense Department, we are implementing a plan involving the donation of water purification tablets and pumping equipment to help restore drinking water to the city. And that will help, but it's not a complete answer, obviously.

Perhaps the main problem is the Bosnian-Serbs do not permit the convoys and the necessary aid to reach the city. They are—

Representative McCloskey. Why could we not say, "you screw around with this convoy, you're going to get shot back. You're going to be blown to bits"?
[Laughter.]
Representative McCloskey. And I'm not being facetious. I'm really not. I believe we're allowing them to get away with murder, murder through genocide.

Secretary Oxman [continuing]. The troops that are on the ground, the UNPROFOR troops have the authority to use all necessary means to assure the delivery of humanitarian aid. The United States has made it clear that in the event the UNPROFOR troops are attacked and request assistance, we will provide assistance from the air. That's the posture. It's, obviously, a very, very difficult situation in Sarajevo and seems to have gotten more difficult in recent days.

Representative McCloskey. Where are we on the so-called peace process now? Where are we with the Serbian-Croatian final partition plan which leaves the Muslims, if we're going to call them Muslims, so little?
Given that sorry excuse for a peace plan, if the fighting did stop, what would we commit to enforce it? The Belgians were telling me that our role is very unclear and that we have not made a commitment. In other words, I could see Milosevic, Karadzic, and the whole darn bunch of them going on, and on, and on, and on. So, why would Mr. Milosevic say yes to this when the slaughter may not even slow down?

Secretary Oxman. Well, it’s not clear to me he has said yes.
Representative McCloskey. I’m not saying he has. We know he has not. Why should he say yes?
Secretary Oxman. From his point of view, I would hesitate to speculate. They’ve indicated they may join the talks in Geneva, but they’ve said that this will require that the shelling of Sarajevo stop. It’s unclear to me when the discussions in Geneva will start. They were supposed to start today or tomorrow, and I think that’s been put off. Our position on that is, we continue to be prepared to help implement a negotiated solution, entered into in good faith by the parties.

With respect to the comment of the Belgian gentleman, I wasn’t sure whether he was commenting about us or about Belgium.
Representative McCloskey. He’s asking about the United States. Would we commit troops to a peace enforcement process, assuming an agreement is signed?
Secretary Oxman. Our position on that remains as stated by the Secretary in February, which is that if there is such an agreement, United States will participate with NATO and the UN in implementing it, and that could include, perhaps, military participation.

Representative McCloskey. OK. As to other recent concerns, I was informed by staff that the Albanian president is reported to have said that Serbia and Greece have an understanding that their borders should be contiguous—they would like to have their borders contiguous. Obviously, that would pose a problem for Macedonia.

What do we know about such plans or rumors?
Secretary Oxman. I saw a press statement to a similar effect that that may be referring to. We are, obviously, concerned about the situation with respect to the expulsion of the Greek Orthodox priests and the counter-expulsion, as it were, of thousands of Albanian nationals in Greece. We’re not aware of any understanding between Greece and Serbia that would have the effect of changing any borders. We welcomed the statement of Prime Minister Mitsotakis to the effect that Greece is not seeking any change in its border with Albania.
Representative McCloskey. So, you don’t know——
Secretary Oxman. No, we don’t.
Representative McCloskey [continuing]. No significant or credible reports of understandings?
Secretary Oxman. No, we don’t, Congressman.
Representative McCloskey. Or rumors along those lines?
What’s the outlook for recognition of Macedonia? To me, they have had a good record of behavior in all of this.
Secretary Oxman. Right.
Representative McCloskey. They were, as you know, the last republic to go from the Yugoslavian federation and have maintained a peaceful posture at all times.

Secretary Oxman. Yes. We voted, along with others, to admit Macedonia to the UN, under the provisional name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. That did not constitute diplomatic recognition by the United States. We have said to the parties involved that we urge the Greeks and the Macedonians to resolve the issues between them, which now seem to boil down mainly to the name issue. And that once that is resolved, we would promptly address the question of actual diplomatic recognition.

That's still our posture. The Greek-Macedonian mediation under the UN auspices will resume in September. There's to be a—

Representative McCloskey. Mr. Oxman, if I could interrupt?

Secretary Oxman [continuing]. Yes.

Representative McCloskey. I've just been given a one minute notice. Just one more quick right question now.

As you know, Kosovo is Serbian territory. The issue of invasion is not applicable there. It has been described by many people, including my friend, John Olver, as an ongoing concentration camp. I don't think that the Serbs honestly need to do anything dramatic there. Is there a magic point at which this constant ethnic cleansing would result in action by the United States?

Secretary Oxman. They do have, as you point out, 20,000 troops or so in Kosovo. There is a situation there where they are in complete control.

Our position is as I said. In the event of Serb-inspired conflict in Kosovo, we will be prepared to respond. I hesitate to put any more specificity on it than that. I don't mean to say by that that we think the situation there is satisfactory. Obviously, there's significant repression. Some of the points that you, and the Chairman, and Congressman Richardson found out in their own trip there as to the treatment of the Albanian population, they're still very, very relevant and have not improved. Now, I don't mean to suggest we think that's satisfactory. But in terms of when we're getting down to what it is the United States is prepared to do and to respond to, we have said that if there is conflict there, inspired by or caused by Serbia, we will be prepared to respond.

Representative McCloskey. We could talk about that indefinitely.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Oxman.

Chairman DeConcini. Congressman from Massachusetts, Mr. Olver?

Representative Olver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for allowing me to take part today, as a non-member.

Chairman DeConcini. Glad to have you, sir.

Representative Olver. Mr. Oxman, whatever I say here, I don't want to be construed as detracting from or minimizing the involvement in humanitarian efforts. In fact, the position of the United States has been for lifting the arms embargo in the case of Bosnia. On the other hand, we are the only world power with a world scope these days, and truly, the only hope for everything that has happened in that area. So that we do bear some responsibility.
Generally, and I didn’t hear the whole of your statement, I find it one where it has been carefully and diplomatically worded in a way that, essentially, accepts the impotence of the civilized world community regarding the situation in Bosnia.

The sanctions. You have indicated that the sanctions are fairly well preserved on the Bulgarian, Romanian, and Hungarian borders. That leaves the Macedonian border, particularly since there have been writings about this. It would appear that traffic from Greece through Macedonia is essentially going forward, largely because the lines of communication over a long period of time were in that direction.

What is being done, or what could be done, to make those sanctions functional?

Secretary Oxman. That’s a very pertinent question, Congressman. We discussed it in some depth earlier. I would say that more needs to be done to address that situation. The border is too porous. We have made our concerns known.

We have established, with the cooperation of the Greeks, a system of trying to pre-certify oil shipments from Greece, which we think is an important place to start. So that those shipments will go to Macedonia, but not onward into Serbia.

Representative Olver. If this has been discussed, maybe I should not go over it again. I can see it in the transcript, if it is.

Secretary Oxman. It’s in the transcript in some depth, I think, but I want to just tell you, we are very aware of that problem. We’re trying to address it. It’s not an easy problem, because you raise a new point. That is that the Macedonian and the Serbian economies, because of—

Representative Olver. They’re very much integrated. They’re quite similar to the federal economy in the Soviet Union, in a sense—

Secretary Oxman [continuing]. Exactly.

Representative Olver. —where pieces of it were deliberately placed in massive ways, in one part or another so that they would be interdependent. What’s being done then to create an alternative, an East-West alternative, starting with Bulgaria and Albania, since Albania is largely a Muslim country and both Bulgaria and Macedonia have substantial Muslim minorities, quite substantial in the case of Macedonia? I mean, that’s the way it seems. Other than the fact that Greece is our ally, in a variety of activities, what is being done to create a different dynamic, a different trade and dependence dynamic in that area, or interdependence dynamic?

Secretary Oxman. It’s a difficult and complicated issue that probably requires long-term type solutions. We’re looking at what’s involved. For example, the electricity supply. A significant portion of that into Macedonia comes from Serbia. Trying to reel in replacement electricity, power supply, from other portions or other parts of the region is very difficult.

Representative Olver. It ought not be that difficult from the close lying quite industrial areas in Bulgaria, in the western part of Bulgaria.

Secretary Oxman. I think that’s a fair point. I asked this same question myself recently in an internal meeting and we’re looking
at that to see what is involved. But I'm advised that it is more comp-
clicated than one might think.

Representative OLVER. Since my time is going to be quite lim-
ited, I suspect, you made comments about Kosovo and I've heard a
couple of phrases. Let me repeat them: When Serbia starts eth-
nically cleansing in a proactive way, or has not done so in a pro-
active way. One of those implications, and the other you used
after I came back, Serb-inspired conflict, we will act.

I would just like to reiterate what Mr. Hoyer had said some time
back. Is there anything to suggest that, in fact, we have any inten-
tion of making good on that, that they would believe? And then let
me, as a point, suggest—because I would like to know what is
meant by proactive, or when the conflict really starts.

Several years ago, constitutional autonomy, constitutionally
guaranteed previously was removed. Constitutions do change, but
when they are done in a purely unilateral way, that's a question-
able kind of an act. But autonomy was removed from Kosovo and
more recently, the provincial government was suspended. The lead-
ership has been arrested. The schools have been closed. The Alba-
nians have been taken out of civil service jobs. I don't know what
represents proactive cleansing, or the beginning of proactive ac-
tions on the part of Serbia in this instance. Where does the line
come?

Secretary OXMAN. I think the phrase I used, "proactive ethnic
cleansing" may not be the most felicitous. What I had in mind was
that in Kosovo, there's really been a form of ethnic cleansing going
on. It's sort of a quiet form of ethnic cleansing. If you make life
so—

Representative OLVER. It's all right as long as you don't actually
kill people. You can drive 90 percent of Albanians out slowly, as
long as you do it slowly?

Secretary OXMAN [continuing]. Right. There's sort of slow ver-
sion. And there is evidence of the emigration of a not insubstantial
number of the Albanians in Kosovo because of the difficult, repres-
sive conditions there.

What I meant to say was that in terms of the warning that we
issued and which I referred to earlier, which the prior Administra-
tion made, and which this Administration has reiterated, that is
keyed to the concept of Serb-inspired conflict in Kosovo. And as
I said to Congressman McCloskey, I think it's hard to try and get
too precise about what exactly that means. But the fact is that as
unsatisfactory as the situation is on the ground now in Kosovo, and
as unsatisfactory as it is to have repealed their autonomy—and we
support the reinstatement of their autonomy—nevertheless, the situa-
tion on the ground is quiet, in a sense. There are incidents of vio-
ence, but it's not a situation of widespread violence on the ground
in Kosovo.

Representative OLVER. OK, what would preclude, under the pro-
visions of Resolution 770, the kind of thing that my colleague to my
left had suggested? That if aid, humanitarian aid, is not allowed
through, or they continue with this process of letting it through on
mondays, if the moon happens to be out, after they've taxed it sub-
stantially, so that the best of the material, important material has
been removed—to say aid goes through or else, essentially. Is there
not, in the language of Resolution 770, the provisions to allow the United Nations to somewhere along the way, enforce a resolution?

Secretary Oxman. I believe 770 does provide that all necessary means may be used to get the aid through. And the UNPROFOR troops who are there would have that authority. Whether they're using or exercising all of the authority they have is a question. Obviously, up until now, there has not been action to use force to get the aid through, by- and-large.

With respect to the United States and NATO, they have said that if the UNPROFOR troops are attacked, and they might be attacked for any number of reasons. But let's assume they were attacked. We have said that if they are attacked and request assistance, NATO will protect them from the air. That will be operative as of tomorrow.

Representative Olver. But if they don't get the aid through, thereby being attacked, then, of course, the aid doesn't get through and the situation just continues as it is.

Secretary Oxman. That's right.

Representative Olver. Let me explore for a moment, the arms embargo and this occurred before this Administration, clearly. In September of 1991, which was when the arms embargo was placed, it was requested, if I remember correctly, correct me if I'm wrong, by the then unified Yugoslav government, the Milosevic government.

Secretary Oxman. That's correct.

Representative Olver. That is correct, okay.

So, it was done at the time that there was independence growing on the part of Slovenia and Croatia particularly, with—separations later in the fall, and the attacks upon Croatia. I think I've got the timing correct. It's the following April. So it was done at Yugoslavia's, Milosevic's, request in order to keep arms from getting to what would be the Slovenes and the Croatians, the independent movements there.

Secretary Oxman. I believe that that's essentially accurate. I think there may have been other requests for this at the same time.

Representative Olver. The countries, then, are recognized by the United States in April of 1992 and ultimately admitted to the United Nations.

So the rump Yugoslavia, the remainder of what was Yugoslavia, i.e., Serbia and Montenegro, is removed and they have an opportunity to apply for membership. With the arms embargo, which is there to keep the unitary state, now has, in every one of those cases, the potential that the Slovenian government had to that effect, has in Croatia and in Bosnia, then, the effects of negating their UN membership and recognition by the international community, and providing support for Serbia and Montenegro which were thrown out of the U.N. Isn't that right? Isn't that the situation?

Chairman DeConcini. Mr. Olver, I'm sorry. We're going to have to ask Secretary Oxman to answer that kind of quickly, if we can. We've got to move on.

Secretary Oxman. Very quickly, you've put your finger on almost the heart of the reason why we felt the arms embargo must be lift-
ed, because it has unintended consequences. It was enacted at a time—

Representative OLVER. It had exactly intended consequences but it was Milosevic's intended consequences. The end result is that the one remaining communist dictatorship is doing exactly what it wants. Even they, in the last couple of weeks are boasting about the final solution, if it ends in Bosnia. But again, the final solution does not include only Bosnia. It includes Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and if they believe that that kind of approach is going to lead to a containment of the war, against all historical precedent, it seems to me they've seriously misread their history.

Chairman DECONCINI. Congressman?

Representative OLVER. And I'm not accusing you of thinking that, I know our position is one for expanded action early.

Secretary OXMAN. And a determination to prevent spillover of this conflict.

Representative OLVER. Do you know of any historical incident where this kind of appeasement has lead to anything but the opposite effect of what it is intended to do? Do you know of any historical precedence?

Secretary OXMAN. It's hard to search all over historical precedence in my mind. But I can say that I think what we have done up until now is a strong, unmistakable statement that we are determined to prevent spillover of this conflict.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Congressman.

Congressman Wolf, Virginia?

Representative WOLF. Secretary, welcome. I won't take the whole ten minutes, I don't think.

Let me just say, I would disagree with you. I think the Clinton Administration has not done a very good job. I think secondly, you have caused some of the problem by the President, when he was running for election, talked in a very belligerent manner. Then after he was elected and in office for two or three months, rattled the sabre and gave the impression to the poor people of Sarajevo that he was going to do something.

I think you've got to be careful that you don't do that again. If you say you're going to do something, you should be prepared to do something. If you're not going to do something, and clearly, that's a tough decision we all have to make. It's a very, very tough issue. But I think there was a lot of belligerent talk. If you were in one of those little dugouts in downtown Sarajevo, you would have thought that the Clinton Administration was going to do something.

We don't even hear anything from the Clinton Administration. It has sort of been taken off of the front burner and put on the back burner, or not even involved. And when you look at the pictures—I was in Sarajevo. I flew in with a U.S. aircraft, was in Vukovar when they were bombing it back in '91. Those people just don't believe. So, I think you're going to have to be careful.

The only question that I would have, one, I think the embargo ought to be lifted because, clearly, we're not prepared to put in troops. I don't want to see American troops in there. But clearly, we ought to give these people the ability to defend themselves and the embargo ought to be lifted.
The only question I would ask you, it was my amendment to take away MFN from Romania back in the mid '80s. The Reagan Administration opposed it. We were finally successful. It was also my amendment to take away MFN from Serbia. We now see Croatia and Tudjman doing things that I think are inappropriate. I was a strong champion for its independence. But now having seen what it is doing, why would it not be a good idea to remove the Most Favored Nation status from Croatia, or at least put pressure on so that they stop cooperating with the Serbs in doing what they are doing?

Secretary Oxman. We are very concerned about Croatia's cooperation with the Bosnian-Croats and their own conduct in Bosnia. As was stated in the communique of the G-7 summit. We, along with other G-7 nations, feel that Croatia, if they do not cease this conduct, pressure ought to be put on them and sanctions ought to be considered.

Representative Wolf. Could I just ask you, if I were to introduce a resolution in the United States Congress to take away the Most Favored Nation status for Croatia, would the Clinton Administration support that?

Secretary Oxman. I guess I wouldn't want to react—

Representative Wolf. Are they open to it?

Secretary Oxman [continuing]. We are open to considering the range of things that should be tools to increase pressure in this situation because we think the conduct is unsatisfactory and unacceptable. MFN is probably one of a number of tools that needs to be considered. I would have thought an integrated, nuanced, sequenced program of increasing the pressure is probably what is needed. I would sort of hesitate to pick one of them out and make a definitive statement about it, but I would certainly be open to the concept of addressing that as one of the tools.

Representative Wolf. Okay. Well, I appreciate it.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. I think I'll yield so we can hear the witnesses.

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Oxman. Thank you.

[Whereupon, Representative Cardin becomes the Acting Chairman.]

Chairman Cardin. Mr. Secretary, if I might, let me follow up on the point that you made, that our policy is to prevent spillover, and on what Mr. McCloskey said, "what's happened in Kosovo?"

And that is, it may be a little bit easier to identify open action by the Milosevic government in Kosovo. But the systematic ethnic cleansing and other human rights violations that are occurring in Kosovo, in a more subtle setting, can continue for some time, if I understand what you're saying, without evoking additional response by our government. And I think that is what Mr. McCloskey's point. Shouldn't there be a point that we make our position stronger unless the rights of the people in Kosovo are being respected? And the type of actions that are taking place, today are stopped, because there's apt to be open conflict before we take action?

Secretary Oxman. Right. Well, I guess what I want to do is distinguish two things. We are deeply concerned about the situation
in Kosovo. We are doing what we can to try to improve it. We have—AID has a program of about $5 million for Kosovo. We have had monitors on the ground through the CSCE. We have been very sensitive to the situation. Under the overall umbrella that this is a part of Serbia, when all is said and done. So, we have significant constraints on what we can do.

I want to distinguish all of that from what I said earlier about the warning we gave concerning being prepared to respond if there is conflict in Kosovo, caused by Serbia. I think when it comes to making warnings of that kind, it's important to be clear. That's the basis on which we gave the warning. If there's conflict there, we will be prepared to respond. So, it does have that threshold, as it were. It doesn't mean that the ongoing situation is in any sense acceptable. It's not. We support the reinstitution of autonomy in Kosovo, and we are doing what we can to work towards that end. It's a very difficult situation when it's part of a country that is lead by the people, and a leader who have this very different agenda.

Chairman CARDIN. Just switching gears a little bit to the U.S. position as far as the peace negotiations. The concern about rewarding aggression as to the boundary lines that may be finally agreed upon.

Are you satisfied that we are taking the position we are taking with regard to not rewarding the aggressive activities by the Serbs on territorial gains and what impact that could have in the spill-over to the other countries involved?

Secretary OXMAN. We are following the negotiation. We don't know where it will come out, obviously. Whatever they agree, if it is in good faith, a viable agreement, we're prepared to help implement it, as I said earlier. We would certainly hope that the agreement will not reward Serb gains and that there will be significant—in whatever agreement is reached, there would be significant rollback of these Serb gains.

But we're not a part of the negotiation, and we're not in a position to compel this. But that, certainly, is the direction in which we hope the negotiation will go. Obviously, to be realistic, the situation on the ground is one in which the Serbs have achieved more gains over time. That's one of the reasons it's very important that the parties involved seek to achieve a negotiated solution.

Chairman CARDIN. Just to make the observation, the more hope we give out that aggression will be rewarded, the more aggression we are encouraging.

Let me yield the two minutes that I have remaining of my time to Mr. McCloskey.

Representative McCLOSKEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Acting Chairman. Also, welcome to the Committee.

Chairman CARDIN. You move up in seniority on the Committee very quickly.

Representative McCLOSKEY. The two newest members here have. You've probably figured out that I'm a partisan Democrat. I'm a strong Clinton supporter. I believe in the Bill Clinton that ran during the election and in his statements during the first 3 months of the administration. Obviously, this is not your problem, Mr. Oxman, but there's an administration position. I guess we can get
into theological discussions about who's a hawk and who's a dove, and who's an evadist and escapist on the Bosnian crisis.

But quite frankly, to personalize it a little bit, I had about three hours' sleep last night. About 10 or 11 last night, I guess, I made the mistake of picking up the paper and reading about the Bosnian children and the conditions that they're living in. The United States and the West have left an entire region of Europe to rot. We have looked the other way. We are walking away, and I think that Mr. Christopher's remarks concerning "progress" over Bosnia is one of the most outrageous and obscene statements I have ever seen in my life.

You and Secretary of State Warren Christopher on Wednesday called the deteriorating situation in Bosnia "tragic" and said there was nothing more the United States could do to end the killing there. Will we ever intervene in Sarajevo? We will not allow the Bosnians to be armed? Will we not come to their aid? We, in essence, are complicit in their execution. History will know that. I just ask you as the chief State Department official on this issue to take that back, because the Congress and the whole world knows what is going on.

Chairman Cardin. Mr. Secretary, you can respond if you like.

Secretary Oxman. I'll certainly take that back. I have not seen the statement you're referring to, Congressman.

Chairman Cardin. Mr. Secretary, let me thank you very much for your testimony, your candid response to our questions.

Secretary Oxman. Thank you very much.

Chairman Cardin. We will now invite up to the panel, Paul Warnke, who has had a distinguished career in the United States Government, dealing with foreign policy, defense and arms control issues. He's well qualified to look at the potential for spillover in terms of U.S. interests in Europe, and has recently written on the Bosnian conflict from the point of view of NATO's role in a post-Cold War Europe.

We also have Mr. Bugajski of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and John Lampe of the Woodrow Wilson Center, who will each present their views on the potential for spillover, directly and broadly. Both have extensive background and first-hand observations of developments in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans as a whole.

We will start with Ambassador Warnke.

Welcome. It's a pleasure to have you.

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR PAUL C. WARNKE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Ambassador Warnke. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, I have submitted a written statement which I would like to be placed in the record. I'll try and summarize it briefly.

Chairman Cardin. Without objection, all the statements will be included in the record in their totality.

Ambassador Warnke. The Commission has raised a number of questions with regard to American interests in the post-Cold War
Europe, and what we ought to do about it. And in particular, what the role of NATO should be.

Back in November of 1991, we had a meeting of the foreign ministers of NATO. They addressed these questions and came up with what I believe to be the proper analysis. What they said was that with the end of the Cold War, the real risks to allied security would arise from "the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe."

They have the right diagnosis, but they have no prescriptions to offer. Meeting just a couple of months ago, the defense ministers called for no further decreases in the defense budgets of the NATO member countries because they said that "stabilization of defense expenditures, as well as a more effective use of our national and collective resources, are necessary to enable the alliance to respond in a timely and effective way to the challenges of the future." But if NATO continues to refuse to put its muscle where its mouth is, it's hard for me to see why we should continue spending the amount of money that we're spending on NATO, or why the alliance should survive.

The Serbian aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to a lesser extent, Croatian complicity in it, has found NATO inert. But I'm not really hopeful about most of the proposals that have been made. I don't see, for example, that it makes much sense to say wait until these three conflicting groups have worked out a political solution, and then we'll introduce forces. No solution that is worked out with Milosevic and with Tudjman is going to guarantee anything for the Bosnian Muslims.

I think instead, what we ought to do is to take dramatic action. What I have called for is that we go to NATO and say "prove that you are worth our continued support. What is it that you are there for? What is the mission of NATO in a post-Cold War situation?" And I think it is up to them to respond. I wouldn't purport to draw up what the military plan should be, but we ought to recognize that if this concept of an ethnic state is allowed to flourish, then peace will never occur.

We have a lot of situations that are like Yugoslavia. There are very many such situations in the former Soviet Union. If all of those are going to become cultural entities and there's going to be ethnic cleansing, then we're in for a very, very messy post-Cold War world and there is no possibility of a new world order that's worth the name.

I was very taken by a speech that the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Richard von Weizsacker, made here in Washington a couple of months ago. And what he said was that the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia is an example of what he referred to as the outmoded concept of the nation as a homogeneous cultural entity. I don't believe we could wash our hands with regard to what is happening in what used to be Yugoslavia and say it's the inevitable consequence of ancient hatreds. For long periods of time, these people have been able to live together. They could do it again.

I think that this conflict has really been fomented by a campaign of propaganda, where there has been no free press, no free television, and the Serbs have been made to believe that they are the
victims. The fact of the matter is, Belgrade is not being shelled. Zagreb is not being shelled. Sarajevo is being shelled. And I don’t think that we can just say, it’s a distant country that bears no resemblance to any situation of serious concern to American interests. We are in an increasingly interdependent world economy. If this kind of situation is allowed to develop and to spread, which it will unless it’s stopped, then there is no chance for any sort of economic recovery. The economic integration of Europe becomes a laugh and we lose the opportunity to see new developing markets for our products and for our technology.

So that I believe the time has come to stop relying on the word of Mr. Milosevic, to stop figuring that somehow, the Serbs are going to be reasonable. They have demonstrated that they are not. I think that there is no possible response except a show of military force. And that show of military force ought to be NATO acting, as they said would, at the behest of either the United Nations, or the CSCE. It’s the one available military instrument.

Now, I don’t know what it will take. There is always concern, of course, about the slippery slope, getting involved in an endless war. But I think that there is an equally good chance, perhaps a better chance, that a substantial real show of force will back off these half-trained militiamen now engaging in these atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At least we ought to try. Now, people say it may be very, very difficult. Any sort of a serious situation presents difficulties and you can’t rely on analogies. You can’t say another Viet Nam. You can’t say it’s just that somehow, you’re going to run into the same sort of problem that the Nazi invaders ran into in Yugoslavia back during World War II. It’s a very different sort of situation.

I believe that NATO can do the job. We should insist that NATO do it. We should be willing to participate with even the introduction of American ground forces. I think the moral imperative is clear and the time for action is way overdue. Thank you very much. Chairman Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Doctor Lampe?

TESTIMONY OF DR. JOHN R. LAMPE, DIRECTOR, EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS

Doctor Lampe. This meeting here in Washington reflects the possibility in this place, not an actually widespread perception in Southeastern Europe, that the United States has placed this small unit of 320 troops in Macedonia with the larger purpose of serving as a trip wire that will bring further forces to bear on any Serbian effort to move against the Albanian population of Kosovo, 90 percent or more, of Macedonia itself, some 30 or 35 percent of the total.

In my recent visits to the region and also some good reporting from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Research Institute on Macedonia convinced me that this small U.S. contingent will not now have the deterrent effect that any U.S. presence would have had earlier in the conflict. No one I met in the region expects any decisive military intervention under any circumstances from the United States. And after the false advertising that Congressman Wolf
referred to, the UN, or NATO. That is the bad news. Perhaps modified by the objections raised in the Milosevic meeting, very strenuous ones, to the presence of American troops in Macedonia. So, we must be doing something good there.

The good news, at least for the time being, is that no one in that area, in fact, expects the Serbian side to initiate a wider war in Kosovo or Macedonia. Let me spell out the reasons for this "optimism" before going on to emphasize the way in which sanctions against Serbia are hurting rather than helping the prospects for peace and democracy throughout the region. I will conclude by arguing that these sanctions be adjusted, both tightened and relaxed, and turn that tightening to the Macedonian border we've discussed a number of times already.

The reasons that no wider war impends may be found in Belgrade and also in Macedonia. The Milosevic regime itself has not turned more toward radical nationalism nor lost ground to the Radical Party of Vojislav Seselj. The regime's difficulties with Radovan Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs over the latter's failure to accept the Vance-Owen Plan were real to them and reflect, I think, a loss of close control, maybe even of close relations that certainly did exist before.

The subsequent dismissal of Dobrica Cosic as President by Milosevic's parliament and the arrest and outrageously vicious beating of opposition leader Vuk Daskovic and his wife by Milosevic's police, probably by a special police unit called up from Kosovo a week before, anticipating violence in Belgrade over Cosic's dismissal. Even with concessions to Seselj and, concessions to Seselj or the other radicals, they were a coordinated, calculated effort to tighten Milosevic's own hold on political power in Serbia, his primary aim all along. They reflect his regime's growing reliance on the police force, now reportedly 70,000, rather than the army of perhaps 80,000 and of doubtful capacity to fight, I think even in Kosovo. The pretext for Cosic's long-awaited removal was reportedly a remark he made to army generals questioning the growing size of the police force.

Now, why would Milosevic risk using that doubtful army force in Kosovo when his police already hold its population under strict martial law? Why would the disciplined Albanian political organization of Ibrahim Rugova in Kosovo risk the fate of the Bosnian Moslems when no serious prospect of Western assistance impends? Whatever our intentions may or may not be, I don't receive the impression that the Kosovo side will see help as coming.

Turning to Macedonia, why would Milosevic respond to the Seselj-led efforts to demand rights for the small Serbian minority? That's been going on recently in Macedonia. Why when his regime already receives the one valuable commodity that Macedonia can provide it, oil shipments in defiance of UN sanctions? The Macedonian government does not encourage or condone these shipments, but their movement is out of limited control, out of the limited control of the Macedonian government. New York Times and Washington Post articles recently bring this out into the open.

Neither the ethnic Macedonian majority nor the large Albanian minority in Macedonia would accept a Serbian invasion without a fight, and as poorly armed as they are, and very poorly armed in-
deed, they would provide real opposition to Serbian forces whose morale and training is questionable.

I therefore reject not only the tight link that is presumed and once did bind the Bosnian Serbs to Belgrade, but also the corollary the pending partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the victory for Greater Serbia West that now prompts the pursuit of Greater Serbia South. That doesn’t make the Milosevic regime any nicer. I do not, however, accept the idea that there is nothing the United States can do, given the clear popular and also military mandate not to commit ground troops to the area. I’m afraid that’s the case. Which Congressmen here would commit troops, individuals from their own district, to face life threatening combat in Bosnia.

[Whereupon, Chairman DeConcini returns to preside over the Commission.]

Doctor LAMPE. But there is still something we can do. We can begin by helping the Bosnian Moslems to drive the hardest, best protected bargain they can with Serb and Croat forces that can not be trusted to honor agreements without fear of military punishment, air strikes included. The Croatian military presence in Herzegovina started too soon. It has included too many misdeeds against civilians, first Serbs, now Muslims, to be called opportunism, or to qualify as potential allies in a mythical multinational force that won’t appear anyway.

Instead, the United States should consider seconding the warning of trade sanctions against Croatia, to be delivered this week by the EC Foreign Ministers, or perhaps Congressman Wolfs MFN notion, as economic pressure to encourage the Croatian government to do what many people in Zagreb want it to do. End the presence of the Croatian army units in Herzegovina, and cut off support for a regime in Herceg-Bosna that has dirtied its hands with ethnic cleansing. Such a step would surely strengthen the Croatian governments case for international support in negotiations over its own Serb-occupied territory.

Now, what would help to drive a harder bargain with the Bosnian Serbs, who still—oh, I wish Belgrade would accept this—bear the responsibility for starting the war and committing the most misdeeds? My answer may be surprising. I will argue that my answer is also far reaching, promising to affect neighboring countries in a positive way. We urgently need to reexamine the effect of the blanket sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro and to change them in two ways. First, the restrictions on petroleum products and any attendant financial transactions need to be tightened, particularly, along the Macedonian border. This is the only military supply on which the Bosnian Serbs depend—and a chance—was lost when the international community did not make the Milosevic regime an offer it could not refuse in joining to seal the Serbian-Bosnian border to such shipments this past spring.

Let’s now seal the Macedonian-Serbian border to any oil and military supplies, period. There are already rumors in Belgrade that the U.S. troops are in Macedonia to prepare for some kind of sanctions enforcement. The West will have to help—through the CSCE which has been, in fact, charged with that task so far. But such a process is conceivable for Macedonian authorities only if a
second sort of change is made in the sanctions that affect not only the former Yugoslavia, but also the surrounding countries.

That second change is to lift sanctions on every manufactured, raw material, or spare part even remotely connected to supply of food and medicine, and also to allow the—of food supplies, particularly crucial for Bulgaria. The present supposed exemption of food and medicine that's—example, resulting instead in the near total exclusion of medicine from Serbia and the blockade of Bulgarian, Greek and Macedonian foodstuffs from reaching the European markets on which they depend.

Recently, an extraordinary congress of Serbian doctors, quite independent of the Milosevic regime and entirely unreported in the West, convened in Belgrade to detail the horrors that the absence of spare parts, medical equipment, pharmaceutical raw materials are visiting on the local population. Three clinics in Belgrade are already closed because of no food, no detergent, no medicine. Further, they faced demand for 400 heart operations with the paraphernalia needed for 15. All of this, as discussed in the meeting, provided comfort to regime propaganda that publicizes the "unjust sanctions" that's responsible for everything. Now winter is coming. Hospitals are to be heated to 45 degrees like the rest of Belgrade after November. The rest of the sanctions plus the bankruptcy of the regime's own economic policies are going to keep plenty of economic pressure on the regime. Mind you the inflation rate is not 350 percent; it's 500 percent.

But the urban civilians of Serbia who would not accept the responsibility for supporting the Milosevic regime now face the prospect of a medical catastrophe and of devoting every effort to physical survival, a prospect that may soon drive the Milosevic regime and give them a legitimate reason for rationing, which puts that population under still tighter control.

I conclude with some comment on the benefits that would accrue to the democratic transitions underway in neighboring countries if sanctions were lifted in these areas related to medicine, and then we try to get transit for foodstuffs opened up. Hungary has already lost an estimated $500 million in exports and imports because of present sanctions, but Bulgaria has lost a minimum of $1 billion, according to an International Claims Commission estimate, and over $2 billion by the estimates of its own government. I offer the Committee several official Bulgarian statements furnished kindly by their embassy, but also a statement of the losses to both Bulgaria and Romania prepared in March by Sofia's Center for the Study of Democracy.

In a recent meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria's Prime Minister Liuben Berov told me that he does not expect that Bulgaria will receive the compensation it should for these losses, but still affirmed his government's efforts to honor those sanctions, efforts that deserve the praise of this Commission. The lifting of all food related transit sanctions would provide at least partial repair to the Bulgarian economy's agricultural sector that is hurting badly, an economy where private trade exploded in the past year and deserves all the encouragement we can provide to grow more, and to help pay taxes legally.
We can say the same for Macedonia's private trade, but should add that it is still more involved in breaking sanctions and pays even less taxes. Immediate U.S. recognition of Macedonia, plus U.S. trade would allow us to take advantage of the presently constructive relations between the governments of Macedonia and Bulgaria and work with them in closing off the major source of petroleum supplies to the Bosnian Serbs.

And this time, let's couple that recognition with the needed military presence the West failed to provide in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and put a troop size of significance into Macedonia. The insignificance of the present numbers were commented on by every person I spoke with in Southeastern Europe. The smallness of the numbers are noted over there. If Serbia wants more relief from sanctions, let its regime invite outside help in closing off its own borders to Bosnia. If Greece wants greater security from any potential Turkish threat in the region, let its government ask for recognition of Macedonia and encourage the economic connections that have helped Greek relationship with Bulgaria. Greece, the biggest investment in Bulgaria these days, the biggest formal investor and yet support the East-West links from Bulgaria, to Macedonia, to Albania Elected, working away for them. But those are long-term projects, and I have been speaking here of what limited, but still, I think, significant efforts we could promote in the short run. Thank you.

Chairman DeConcini. Thank you, Mr. Lampe.

Mr. Bugajski?

TESTIMONY OF JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES AT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. Bugajski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm going to try and confine myself simply to exploring some points from my written statement and I'll try and keep to within about five or six minutes.

The first part of the problem is with ethnic conflicts in post-communist Eastern Europe. I see two clear and present dangers. One pertains to the escalation of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to other former Yugoslav republics. Secondly, the potential imitation of such conflicts where demagogues exploit ethnic and religious divisions, elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the DINS. I would focus here on the first danger where I see three possible scenarios of escalation.

The first I would call the Second Serb-Croat War, particularly in the Krajina region, which is currently held by Serbs. I believe that the partition of Bosnia could re-ignite armed conflicts along a very long front. Serbs and Croats may be willing to compromise on the question of territory, and make deals with regard to the territory of a third party, in other words, the Muslims, but neither seems willing to sacrifice territory in Croatia. Serbs, of course, will argue that the partition of Bosnia sets a precedent for the partition of Croatia, and Zagreb in turn will argue that it was recognized within its old administrative borders and must, therefore, regain its territories.
I do not believe Serbs will accept autonomy within Croatia and they've made moves, indeed, in the past few weeks towards the unification with the Serbian Republic in Bosnia. The only problem remaining to my mind is where and how will the next war start? Will it expand and propel us into inter-republican wars, which we didn't have the first time around? And what will be the best solution to try and forge a political settlement? Or should we try to forge a political settlement, or simply let the protagonists destroy each other?

The second potential conflict I see is the South Balkan war. This would be fought, and this has already been mentioned several times, either in Kosovo or Macedonia. This would be potentially much more dangerous than the Serb-Croatian War because it would embroil, I think, almost automatically, in one form or another, six neighboring states, including two NATO members, many of whom have conflicting ambitions over Macedonia. I believe, however, the war in Macedonia is preventable, if we are to act now to stabilize the republic, both internally and externally. Just to reiterate, I believe Macedonian recognition within its own borders, NATO protection, and some package of economic incentives which could help stabilize the situation domestically.

Kosovo, I believe, is much more problematic. However, sooner or later Belgrade would either have to offer autonomy to the Albanians or expel them. In Kosovo, I believe, pressure should be placed on both sides, to enter talks and formulate a timetable for autonomy. In other words, if the Albanian leaders refuse, little support can be offered for their moves toward autonomous statehood. If Belgrade refuses then, obviously, the only alternative—would be to accept the partition of Serbia. In other words, if Bosnia could be partitioned and possibly Croatia, why not Serbia?

The third potential conflict I see, or series of conflicts, is what I call the Yugoslav implosion, and there are several tinderboxes, as has already been mentioned. Aside from Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandjak, there is the question Montenegro which has not been mentioned. The Montenegrin government, I believe is poised between unity and secession.

The other thing, I believe, that's possible is some form of military crackdown leading to civil war in Belgrade itself, and in Serbia, either between rival militias, between army and the paramilitaries, between Milosevic and his former nationalist allies, or economic conditions could precipitate social breakdown adding to the potential of civil war. In Serbia, sanctions are taking a long time to take effect, but I do believe and they're biting now, and they'll bite even harder this fall and this winter.

Let's examine the policy toward the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I believe, that besides sanctions, there has to be a package of incentives. In other words, Belgrade, I believe, has to be given the clearest type of conditions for easing sanctions. For example, recognizing Macedonia, in exchange for cooking oil. Disbanding of paramilitary and apprehension of war criminals, in return for toilet paper and disinfectant. The List could go on. Moreover, I believe, democratic forces in each state, including Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro must be given more substantive support. I believe our efforts so far have been less than adequate. One would want to in-
clude economic assistance and medical aid through the independent union, civic organizations and so on, in addition to media facilities so people there receive independent broadcasts in Serbian—that's very important.

And even, I would add let's explore the possibility of some kind of international Balkan conference with representatives from each state, so that we can help build the kind of democratic states we'd like to see in the Balkans. In conclusion, I do not believe that the Balkan wars have run their course. Thank you.

Chairman DeCONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Bugajski.

Ambassador Warnke, I read your testimony and I was not here for it, but I appreciate very much your strong statements.

Let me ask you, Ambassador, as a Defense Department official during the Viet Nam years, you must have some thoughts on the comparison between the Yugoslav problem, the Yugoslavia problem, and have heard the arguments of the quagmire. "We can't afford to get in. We'll never get out. We'll have another Viet Nam."

Can you give us your thoughts and tell us whether you think that is legitimate argument? If not, why not, and what distinctions you make?

Ambassador WARNKE. Mr. Chairman, I really see no parallel between Viet Nam and the present problem in the Balkans. In Viet Nam, we were under an ideological compulsion. We thought that we had to go into Viet Nam to block China from expanding all the way through Asia. It turned out to be a mistake, but an understandable, mistake because initially we thought that the Soviet Union and China together were going to form a communist monolith to take over the world.

Containment worked in Europe. We thought we ought to try it in Asia, too. Now, it turned out that most of the Vietnamese regarded us as just another colonial oppressor. So, as a consequence, we didn't even have currency in South Viet Nam. The national hero was Ho Chi Minh. We made a mistake.

Now, what I'm saying is that here we have a situation in which, right in the heart of Europe, we have this bloody conflict going on and nobody's doing anything to stop it. I don't think it would take a massive effort. I think if NATO could put in a very significant physical presence, there would be less bloodshed. And I think that we ought to try it. I think if we don't, what we're doing is breeding a situation, sort of like World War II.

Back in September of 1938, Neville Chamberlain said that the Czechoslovakian problem was a quarrel in a faraway country, among people whom we knew nothing about. Now, with today's communication, transportation, the inter-connection of the international economy, this sort of a conflict is even more disruptive. And I believe that we ought to step in. We ought to do it through NATO. It should not be a unilateral American effort. But I see no parallel with Viet Nam.

Maybe it wouldn't work, but we sure should try.

Chairman DeCONCINI. Yes, thank you.

You're advocating that NATO should take a military response here, if necessary?

Ambassador WARNKE. That's correct.
Chairman DeConcini. If NATO fails to do so, what should the United States do unilaterally, if anything, on the military side?

Ambassador Warnke. I believe that Doctor Lampe has suggested a number of things that we can do. I certainly agree we ought to try that. I don’t believe we could go in with military force, unilaterally.

Chairman DeConcini. Unilaterally.

Ambassador Warnke. I don’t think the American public would stand for it. I don’t think the Congress would stand for it.

Chairman DeConcini. Ambassador, you have reviewed, I suspect, the Vance-Owen-Stollenberg negotiations. Does that lead you to believe that it is leading to a conclusion that would, in fact, reward Serb aggression and Croat opportunism in the area? And is there any merit to a settlement, even if—and what if Bosnia-Herzegovina, Isabegavic did agree to it, is it the right thing to do under any circumstances?

Ambassador Warnke. I don’t believe it is. I think, in the first place, it does reward Serbian aggression. Also, I don’t think it would hold. I think instead of that, what you need is a political settlement, if necessary, arbitrated by the United Nations, as has been suggested by my colleagues. There’s nothing so sacrosanct about the borders of Serbia. So, as a consequence, if they’re going to try and partition other parts of what used to be Yugoslavia, their borders are up for grabs, too.

So, I think that one of the real problems has been the Vance-Owen Plan. You couldn’t implement it, and at the same time, there was no alternative to it. As David Owen said, it was the only game in town. I’m suggesting another and tougher game.

Chairman DeConcini. Now, I may be wrong here. The latest plan is in place of the Vance-Owen plan, is it not?

Ambassador Warnke. Yes.

Chairman DeConcini. Isn’t there a new plan now that is being floated out there?

Ambassador Warnke. From the standpoint of the Bosnian Muslims, even less satisfactory.

Chairman DeConcini. Even less satisfactory, yes, sir. Thank you.

Doctor Lampe, I noted in your comments regarding the Serbian doctors lack of spare medical equipment and what-have-you, and that this really affects the Serbian people themselves and reacts favorable to Milosevic’s political stability.

Doctor Lampe. Yes.

Chairman DeConcini. How do you rationalize that if we did permit that to come in when, in fact, the situation, say, in Sarajevo for medical supplies is even worse than it is in Belgrade, do we have a, you know, kind of a double standard here that we’re going to let some of this purely humanitarian medical supplies into Belgrade and yet, we can’t get it into Sarajevo?

Doctor Lampe. Well, I would certainly agree that this could not be done in isolation without some kind of Bosnian cease-fire in any case. I wouldn’t be in favor of boxing the Bosnian Moslems into any kind of settlement under the terms that are put forward right now. These are terms for ethnically cleansed territories with the Bosnian Moslem population in a small and vulnerable portion of territory.
That's still a tough nut to crack and whatever motivates Milosevic, I don't think he would respond favorably to this prospect of medical relief. That doesn't suit his purposes anyway.

Chairman DeConcini. Well, it really is just from the humanitarian aspects, that we ought not to be pushing that. It only plays into his hands.

Doctor Lampe. Yes, yes. I'm afraid so.

Chairman DeConcini. Now, did I interpret your testimony that there should be a freer flow of commercial goods that are just transiting Montenegro and Serbia?

Doctor Lampe. The sanctions, too, as I understand them, apply to goods even in transit. What that does, particularly, to Bulgarian food exports, is just catastrophic. The other routes are not only slow but dangerous and costly. They really don't work. It was nice to have the Via Ignatia proposed as an ancient road to be rebuilt from Sofia to Skopje, out to the Albanian coast, but that's a long-term project.

Chairman DeConcini. If that were to be done, how would you enforce the transit where it wouldn't be ripped off by the Serbians? Before the sanctions took hold, there were trains leaving Macedonia, going into Serbia and Montenegro, and supposedly, they could account for them when they came out in Hungary and Romania. But in actuality, they told us, for many of them they couldn't.

Doctor Lampe. Oh, if these were trains of many, many mixed cars, then that wouldn't work. It seems to me that the petroleum products are rather easily identifiable and stoppable, and would be well, hard to mix with foodstuffs.

Chairman DeConcini. But if you had a train of commercial goods such as food, or bedding, or housing material or something that was supposed to go from Bulgaria to Hungary through Serbia, or from Greece, Macedonia through Serbia to Hungary, do you think that's practical to try to set up such sanctions? Aren't we having enough trouble with the sanctions now even, than to think that we could police them by letting them trans-ship through Serbia?

Doctor Lampe. I think the truck shipments could be controlled, anyway. You could separate them out. And if a large number of troops would be needed on the Serbian-Macedonian border to enforce even the existing sanctions, so be it. Because as testimony from all sides makes it clear, oil for Serbia is shipped on through as it is. We need a lot more enforcement there. And then if that enforcement could provide some discrimination, it would provide this relief to the Bulgarian side, and encouragement for the Macedonian cooperation. Then the bulk of the medical supplies could go through; that's pretty small and easy to identify.

Chairman DeConcini. Do you agree with Secretary Oxman—maybe you were here, I think you were—when he said that indeed, the Tudjman regime is knowingly participating in the ethnic cleansing that has been going on in the past few weeks in the eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Doctor Lampe. I'm afraid that's the case and for a lot longer than those few weeks, although this is not something planned from the Tudjman government or from Zagreb, but rather was an alliance made with the Boban forces in Herzegovina who simply went
ahead and did this, and with large numbers of regular Croatian troops there, looking on and certainly not preventing these abuses.

Chairman DeConcini. President Tudjman has reflected or stated to many of us who have been over there that that’s out of his control. That he’s not participating, not sanctioning and—

Doctor Lampe. It’s a possibility.

Chairman DeConcini [continuing]. Otherwise, but I’m wondering what you think.

Doctor Lampe. I think that the presumption that both Zagreb and Belgrade have a console of buttons that can effectively be pushed now is one that needs to be looked at. Although finding the exact information to confirm then about just how out of control the circumstances are, that’s tough. But I think it’s quite likely, in fact, that the Tudjman government does not have anything like complete control over what goes on in Herzegovina.

Chairman DeConcini. Mr. Bugajski, can you give me your opinion? Do you think most Serbs are still supporting Milosevic and his policies of aggression? And are they fully aware of the aggressive action of that regime?

Mr. Bugajski. Yes, I would say Milosevic has a sort of minority of supporters, hard-line supporters. And there’s a solid minority of opposition to Milosevic. The vast majority, I would say, of the Serbian public is simply pre-occupied with trying to stay alive at the moment.

In addition, I would say the mass media, particularly outside of Belgrade, has been okay but most Serbs are simply not aware of what’s been going on in Croatia and Bosnia. If they are, it’s presented in such a skewed fashion that they tend to take the word of the state media as the truth. So, I would say, in answer to your question, let’s say the majority of Serbs is simply wanting to have as normal a life as possible, I would say, without having to make a decision either way vis-a-vis Milosevic.

Chairman DeConcini. In turning to Montenegro, is there any question—is there support there for the Serbian policy, not in the political leadership, but among the people?

Mr. Bugajski. Well, the government of Montenegro, which was initially installed by the Milosevic regime 1989, was the last elections. I believe, again, Montenegro is split between those who support, close membership in the Serbian Federation, and an increasing number of people, and I’ve been there three times in the past nine to ten months, an increasing number of people who do see where Milosevic’s policy is leading them, and in the best of situations would want to distance themselves, and even to secede to gain greater sovereignty.

Chairman DeConcini. Can we anticipate, or could you imagine them wanting to break from Serbia, Montenegro?

Mr. Bugajski. Well, for them to break from Serbia, as I’ve been told, it’s like trying to get off a fast train at the very last moment. They don’t want to go down with the train. I mean, for them to try and secede at this point would, I think, provoke bloodshed on the part of radical forces, paramilitaries that are active there, and the army which is under Milosevic’s control, which could completely suppress the Montenegrin movement, I mean, Montenegro is really like a military barracks.
However, for example, the Montenegrin government itself has formed a coalition with opposition parties and they are fairly well disposed at least thus far to both the Albanian and to the Muslim minorities, and the minority's fears of this government are not nearly as great as of minorities in Serbia.

Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you. My time is up.

I'm going to ask Mr. Cardin, if he plans on staying here if he would finish these hearings, and yield to the other members.

I want to thank the witnesses very much. Ambassador, thank you.

Doctor, thank you very much.

[Whereupon, Representative Cardin resumes role as Acting Chairman.]

Chairman CARDIN. Mr. McCloskey?

Representative MCCLOSKEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Cardin.

I think we're all sorry about the interruptions and the semi-chaos, with Members going in and out to vote. We sincerely appreciate your testimony on this very important subject. I particularly identified, I think, with everything I heard Mr. Warnke saying.

Mr. Warnke, with all your diplomatic experience, could you give your view on what happened in Europe when the administration went there to sell lifting the arms embargo and the possibility of selective air strikes? What do you think happened there?

Ambassador WARNKE. I really know nothing, Mr. McCloskey, except what I read in the papers. It certainly was not a success. I think that quite a perplexing part is that there is a dearth of leadership in Europe, and there's no question about that.

It was extensively reported at the time of the G-7 summit that, regrettably, Mr. Major is still operating in the long shadow of Mrs. Thatcher. Mr. Mitterrand is over age and over-strained. And Mr. Kohl has got tremendous problems with the reunification of Germany. So, really, I think it's going to be necessary for the United States to take a very strong lead. Otherwise we're not going to get our Western allies to do anything.

Representative McCLOSKEY. I'm sure you were here when I mention this Christopher press conference in which he said that we've done everything we can for Bosnia and Sarajevo and that there's nothing more the United States could do to end the killing there. He was specifically asked as to what exactly would prompt us to act in Sarajevo? What can we do for Sarajevo to avoid total wanton murder and destruction? From the text of the press conference. I see that he did not answer that. I've been told, as I mentioned earlier, by the Deputy Commander of UNPROFOR that the West must act if Sarajevo is to be saved.

Do you think it's true to say our policy is primarily one of containment? And isn't it true that anything that happens in that contained area is our responsibility, one shared responsibility with other parties?

Ambassador WARNKE. If that's the case, I regard that as a mistake. It seems to me that we have historical precedent. Unfortunately, we made a statement at one time, back in the early 1950s, that Korea was outside of our area of concern. I think if we write off any area, what that does is give aggressors a free hand. And I think that, unfortunately, the only answer as to what would be
done to try and save Sarajevo is the use of military force. I don’t think we can foreclose that option.

Representative McCloskey. When we had a credible threat of military force, the Serbs backed off.

Ambassador Warnke. And I think they would again.

Representative McCloskey. Yes, I think they would again.

Have you talked to the National Security Council, or had discussions with the administration?

Ambassador Warnke. I’ve sent them my copies of my article. I will send them copies of my testimony.

Representative McCloskey. Okay, thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Cardin. Mr. Olver?

Representative Olver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I deeply regret having missed the statements in their entirety. It’s very difficult to keep some degree of coherence to your thinking under those circumstances on these points.

What Western media are there that function, that could be used to set a different stage to allow the people in Serbia to understand the degree to which the policies have lead to the present situation? To move thinking in perhaps other parts of Eastern Europe—not that that’s a critical nature here, except possibly in Russia. What are the Western media that are available to you to get any kind of message in there?

Doctor Lampe. Well, let’s note, if I could take up on this point, that many people in Belgrade and in the Vojvodina have cable connections and Sky News is on every night. At the same time, I think it’s unfortunate that the Radio Free Europe plan to begin broadcasting, began germinating, oh, I think almost a year ago, is either just starting now——

Representative Olver. Just starting now?

Doctor Lampe [continuing]. In September. It’s September, yes, yes.

Representative Olver. Radio Free Europe.

Doctor Lampe. Radio Free Europe, broadcasting into the separate——

Representative Olver. Is that the same as Voice of America?

Doctor Lampe [continuing]. No, no. Let’s note that the Voice of America has added some programming, but it’s of relatively short duration. And of course, the Voice’s mission is to cover world news and what’s happening in the United States. In particular, Radio Free Europe’s responsibility, over the years, was to cover what was happening in the target country.

Representative Olver. Do the use of Radio Free Europe and/or Voice of America have a route, provided route, which has simply not been effectively used yet?

Doctor Lampe. It may. But let’s notice that in Belgrade and to the north, and even to a certain band to the south, Studio B in Belgrade has been tolerated by the Milosevic regime; they may be closed down after the Draskovic beating, but for now they do continue to broadcast independently. Radio 92 in Belgrade has been still more independent and critical. There is some independent press, too, but it is available only for people who can afford to pay the astronomical price for the magazine Vrema or the newspaper
Borba that just had its editor replaced. So, Borba may not continue to be somewhat independent.

How you crack the countryside, especially to the south where there's fear of the Islamic fundamentalists sweeping in, that's a tougher matter. I don't look for the Radio Free Europe broadcasting alone to do that. But it's so frustrating to stand aside and watch, in this matter, in every respect, that we ought to go ahead and do everything we possibly can.

Representative Olver. Are there any Muslim fundamentalists in Bosnia?

Doctor Lampe. There's going to be an increasing number of them; this is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Representative Olver. Self-fulfilling prophecy, okay.

Doctor Lampe. Yes, yes. But the original number was tiny. And in the Izatbegović government and in his person, and people like Foreign Minister Horis Silajdžić, to identify them with being Islamic fundamentalists is so wildly away from the truth.

Representative Olver. I think it was you, Mr. Lampe, who made a comment about the embargo problems. I think I heard an edge of it as I was either going out or coming in.

The problem for Bulgaria, an agricultural produce, which they're in a particularly difficult position. Is that usually marketed through Central Europe by way of the Danube?

Doctor Lampe. Through the Danube or by truck across the Serbia, yes.

Representative Olver. By truck.

What's the chance of getting the Greek-flag carriers, who seem to be quite willing to carry a lot of oil which gets—by embargo, through Macedonia and into Serbia, to instead carry agricultural supplies through places like—well, any one of the number of places, but I suppose through Trieste or Venice, or places that get into Central Europe by train? It must be just about as fast as going by barge up the Danube, to do it by water routes through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.

Doctor Lampe. I think that may be true for the water transport, but for this tremendous truck traffic that was, I think, the way that most of that produce moved, sending it down to Salonika and Thessaloniki and putting them on—shipping around, I think, is significantly more expensive. But it's worth looking into, although——

Representative Olver. The truck route is longer, certainly, if you go through Romania and Hungary than direct——

Doctor Lampe [continuing]. It's not only longer, but the roads are significantly worse and there are serious security problems, should we say, for crossing the Romanian route.

Representative Olver. Was it you, also, who said something about, if there is to be a stable solution, one ought to also consider the borders of Serbia?

Doctor Lampe. No, I think I'll pass to my colleague on that question.

Mr. Bugajski. Yes, I think I mentioned this, that the partition of Bosnia sets a precedent: in other words, for the partition of Croatia and the potential partition of Serbia, if we are to create borders according to ethnic composition.
Representative OLVER. Yes. But how does one get to that kind of a position? In Kosovo, there are one or two districts that are very heavily Serb. And if you remove those one or two districts, the percentage of Serbs in Kosovo would drop from ten percent to six percent, you know, pulling the numbers out of hat. There are similar kind of smaller areas in this patchwork quilt, which is the ethnic legacy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, essentially, of that——

How does one get there?
Mr. BUGAJSKI [continuing]. Well, as somebody said, Kosovo is practically ethnically pure. Kosovo is already ethnically pure, more-or-less. I mean——

Representative OLVER. Very nearly.
Mr. BUGAJSKI [continuing]. Over 90 percent are Albanians.

Representative OLVER. Which is why I think that if we really were serious about supporting the autonomy of Kosovo, that we would recognize the virtual Albanian purity of that state and indeed, call it Kosovo.

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Well, what I'm suggesting is that we shouldn't operate on the principals of ethnicity. However, this was a province that did have a degree of autonomy under the old federal structure. The only possible solution I can see is to press both sides to reaccept that autonomy. Because otherwise, you're going to have complete polarization, which I believe you have now, with the Albanian-Kosovo leadership wanting to form an independent republic and the Serbs in Belgrade wanting to fully incorporate Kosovo in a greater Serbian state.

My idea was to bring on to the table a specific timetable or discussions exactly on the status of Kosovo. Otherwise, Serbian intransigence would mean political moves would be taken to recognize the independence of Kosovo, or if the Albanians refused to participate, to disassociate ourselves from Albanians demands.

Representative OLVER. I think Ambassador Warnke mentioned in hindsight, I believe, the earlier recognition of independence. At that time, maybe it would have made some sense to have an international conference. The sorts of things that occurred in 1815 and 1878 and times like that to deal with all the problems of the former Yugoslavia. Once it becomes clear that these people do not wish to remain “married” so-to-speak, as was the issue for Slovenia and Croatia, feeling that they were in danger, serious danger, of domination, at least politically and militarily. That kind of a conference was perhaps the appropriate thing, and maybe it is now.

Let me ask you what you think about that as a concept. And if that's a viable concept, how does one get there, except by from extremely strong expression of the will of the Western Community, lead by the U.S., that this present situation can not be tolerated? I am, I think, maybe going beyond Doctor Lampe's suggestion that maybe he doesn't think that Milosevic doing what he's doing in Bosnia suggests that he has designs on doing similar things in Kosovo and Macedonia, and continuation in Croatia, and so forth.

Mr. BUGAJSKI. Well, to address one point you made, I have in mind some kind of brokered peace conference in which all parties would be represented, as well as the leaders of minority groups. I think one idea I did have was, if we also have a peace conference,
it should be on a more permanent basis. It should be co-sponsored by the Americans, the EC, and the Russians. And quite possibly it should be based in Macedonia on a permanent basis. In other words, to show all the other countries that we are serious about protecting the independence integrity of Macedonia.

Representative OLVER. I would suggest it should be placed in Sarajevo as an expression that that city will live.

Mr. BUGAJSKI. It may be too late.

Representative OLVER. It may be too late. Isn't that disgusting?

Mr. BUGAJSKI. I agree.

Representative OLVER. Thank you.

Chairman CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Olver.

Let me first make an observation from the testimony of all three of you. The failure to deal with ethnic diversity in this region will only lead to more ethnic conflict in other parts of Europe. And, it is clear ethnic diversity and peaceful relations can be synonymous. You can have a society that's very rich with ethnic diversity. Our current policy, as it relates to Bosnia, is leading to—not necessarily solving the problems of the region. We have to reach for a different approach. You each suggested somewhat different approaches to take, but agreed the current policy is not working.

We, obviously, are very concerned at this Commission with trying to have the United States lead the world, and coming up with a satisfactory policy as it relates to the former Yugoslavia.

Mr. Ambassador, you have suggested that we take, or encourage, military action, preferably under the banner of NATO. What type of military action do you believe is needed in order to bring about a satisfactory policy in this region?

Ambassador WARNKE. I couldn't suggest a specific military plan. I mean, that's up to NATO. That's why we have NATO.

Chairman CARDIN. But are we talking about ground forces?

Ambassador WARNKE. Ground troops, I think significant ground presence. I think anything short of that is going to be futile.

Chairman CARDIN. Would you place the ground forces within both Bosnia and Serbia?

Ambassador WARNKE. Initially, I'd say within Bosnia. I think that then you've got to pose the question of what happens if the war breaks out again in a part of Croatia, where it is largely Serbian occupied.

Chairman CARDIN. Do you have any prediction as to the number of people that would need to be involved and the length of time that we should be prepared to put up with, as far as how long it would take to have a successful completion of the mission?

Ambassador WARNKE. Well, I think we've even been talking about a force of something like 70,000 to try and enforce a settlement that involved the three way partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, if we're considering putting that number in after we have a political solution which is basically unworkable, what I am suggesting is put them in now and work out a political solution that is workable. I think something like 70,000 would do it.

Chairman CARDIN. Would that number be to implement a peace solution and to stop the atrocities that are taking place?

Ambassador WARNKE. Initially, to stop a war, to stop the killing. And I'd say the bigger the force, the less opposition it would en-
counter. It's going to be hard. There's no question about it. Because you start off with the fact that some members of NATO are not logical participants in that sort of a force. It would be very hard to put Greeks and Turks in. And there's just not enough Scandinavians to go around.

Chairman CARDIN. For how long a period of time do you think we should reasonably anticipate that troops in the range of 70,000 would be needed?

Ambassador WARNKE. I think it really depends upon what happens then. What I am saying is that I think there is a significant chance that that would back down Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Tudjman. That they would realize that they had run into a little bit more than they wanted to take on. There have been instances in the past when we have shown our teeth—when I say we, I'm using it in terms of the Western alliance—that they have made concessions.

But now, it's pretty clear to them that nobody is going to do anything about it. So, they're getting a free ride. I think if we make it clear that it's going to be costly, then I believe they would be more reasonable and you could work out a political settlement. I think that perhaps it's going to require some arbitration.

Chairman CARDIN. Doctor Lampe?

Doctor LAMPE. Well, I'd just like to speculate here on whether this force containing American ground troops is ready, presumably, to take losses in various Congressional districts, and how it would operate in a situation where, as was said by Chairman DeConcini, Serb and Croat forces in Bosnia are not under tight and effective control from panels of buttons in Belgrade and in Zagreb. How would they proceed if there was no agreement, and simply this large contingent of NATO forces arriving, I guess, into Sarajevo, to hold the Moslem parameter and try to assert itself in the other areas.

The specifics of this are very troubling indeed, and they take me back to what I consider to be the lost opportunity of the Vance-Owen framework that did not have ethnically cleansed provinces, but rather, preserved each one of those territories as being ethnically mixed. And if just every side had signed, then we would have put the 70,000 in the very next day and have some chance of saying "we're enforcing an agreement and we're going to just respond very vigorously to anybody who challenges any part of it."

But without that agreement, I worry about how that could be prevented from becoming a bloody business for American ground forces.

Representative OLVER. Would the Chairman yield?

Chairman CARDIN. I'd be glad to, sure.

Representative OLVER. Doctor Lampe, you just mentioned the Vance-Owen plan and its ethnic diversity. In fact, I think too little, perhaps, was said about the Vance-Owen plan and its original suggestion. I mean, the Vance-Owen plan, to me, I have no idea—maybe one of you can tell me—why they would have given huge territories, which were majority Muslim in Bosnia into Croatiodominated districts, essentially, in the area to the West, the Northwest of Sarajevo? But that's beside whether you can, because I think that has contributed significantly to the way the Croatians and Tudjman have looked at the situation on the ground.
But I think too little has been said about the Vance-Owen Plan in its original, its inception was based on the idea that people would be allowed to return to their homes.

Doctor Lampe. Absolutely.

Representative Olver. However, I think it was Ambassador Warnke who pointed out that you couldn’t implement—the exact words I don’t remember, but I think couldn’t be implemented. Is there anything that ethnically cleansed areas—in some cases Muslim populations out of communities, both the Croat and the Muslim populations out of communities wherever—since they have—under U.N. supervision as part of the agreement in relation to UN forces in the Krijina.

Doctor Lampe. Well, there were still a million people who would be minorities under Vance-Owen in those various proposed provinces. And admittedly, an unenforced Vance-Owen would have run the great likelihood that each group, and maybe Muslims included, would have cleansed their province right away. But that’s—

Representative Olver. That’s what not to do.

Doctor Lampe [continuing]. But that’s where agreement immediately followed by the large Western military presence—I mean the next day—could, in fact, have helped—

Representative Olver. But wouldn’t you agree that the implementation of it would have required large-scale kind of force.

Doctor Lampe [continuing]. Oh, yes. We had a meeting at the Wilson Center in February that came to that very firm conclusion. That without this kind of major force that Ambassador Warnke—

Representative Olver. But there was no agreement. It would have had to have been imposed.

Doctor Lampe [continuing]. Yes.

Representative Olver. Yes, it would have had to have been imposed.

Chairman Cardin. Following up on that point, if we were to convene the peace conference at this particular moment, with the current military situation in the various areas, what is the likelihood of reaching a satisfactory agreement? It seems the bargaining strengths at this particular moment would not be even based upon the current policies.

Mr. Bugajski. Well, the idea of the conference is to address all of the issues that are pending. In other words, the minority issues and territorial issues, ways of fostering the economic cooperation, political cooperation, it could be included with Bosnia, but I envisage it more in terms of the Southern Balkans.

Chairman Cardin. With all the atrocities that are taking place on a daily basis, does it make sense to try to convene that conference at this point?

Mr. Bugajski. This isn’t all I would suggest. If we are serious about preventing war from spreading South, I think this is an important element. Second, Bosnia is another matter. There, I believe some kind of military protection is going to be have to be offered to the entity that’s left once the Serbs and the Croats carve out the territory they want.

Representative Olver. Mr. Chairman, would you yield again?

Chairman Cardin. Sure, Mr. Olver.
Representative Olver. There isn't any reason, at this point, for the Serbs to ever stop. As has happened throughout resolution after resolution, and as the Ambassador has suggested, sometimes when it looked as if there might be some teeth, they stopped for at least moments and waited to understand that, in fact, there were to be no teeth and then continued.

Why would there be any reason for them to stop? They're going to get exactly what they want, even if it requires the world to watch as a few more hundred thousand people are starved out. I mean, the world, at least as I'm getting it, is that Mr. Karajic has said clearly, that they will starve out—and that if necessary, they have the weaponry to level Sarajevo. What further expressions does the world want? Is there enough will in the Western World, in the European Community, to even provide the resources to allow the Muslim population of that area, all speaking the same language, not visibly or any other way different, to escape and go someplace where they can win? Would there even be that much will on the part of the Western World at this point?

Mr. Bugajschi. You mean, to give the Muslims a homeland somewhere? I am personally dismayed at the lack of Western resolve during the past 2 years, not only to the inability of the West to protect millions of civilians, even Croat and Serb civilians that have been caught in this war. They also have mixed marriages which represent—

Representative Olver. Mixed marriages represent 20 percent or 25 percent of the population of Sarajevo, at least. Maybe not in the rural districts.

Mr. Bugajschi [continuing]. What it boils down to is, we haven't been able to enforce law and order. We've allowed gunmen, we've allowed rapists, and we've allowed Xenophobes of the worst kind, cut-throats, to dominate this society. And we simply sat by and allowed them to do it, and that's a tragedy.

Representative Olver. If you will indulge me one more moment, Mr. Chairman.

If there were to be a conference to look at all the issues of the Southern Balkans, because there's Albania, there's Sandjak, there's Kosovo, there's Macedonia. I mean, maybe it's partly redoing things that happened slightly more than a century ago in the relationship of Macedonia, and whether it was Western Bulgars or Southern Serbs, or other things of that sort, and Croatia and so forth.

What kind of expression of will on the part of EC, NATO, the U.S., the UN, any one of these wonderfully powerful and totally impotent bodies at the present time would be enough of a signal to allow, to create the atmosphere for such a conference? What signal? One of the three of you, or all of you.

Chairman Cardin. We've got about two more minutes.

Mr. Bugajschi. I would say that there are several signals, there isn't one. The conference isn't going to solve it on its own. Economic assistance isn't going to solve it on its own. Recognition of Macedonia isn't going to solve it on its own. I would say a package of initiatives, including those I've just mentioned, as well as several others. Protection of Albania, moves towards autonomous status for Kosovo. I think there has to be a package presented by the West which has force behind it in order to enforce it.
Doctor Lampe. And I would just add that as unlikely as it is now for any chance of success for the kind of ground force that is really behind the impulse to intervene, the movement of relief supplies, the way that they are now frustrated and defied, it leads one to wonder how some selective air support of a designated convoy would proceed? It’s a risky venture, but if it was tied to other coordinated initiatives, I’ve come around to the position—having opposed unconnected air strikes before—to feel that some such risky measure, in fact, might be justified.

Representative Olver. Thank you. I think lift and strike would have produced that atmosphere, wouldn’t it?

Chairman Cardin. Let me thank all three of you for your very frank testimony here today, and your willingness to help us.

Obviously, this is an extremely important priority of our Commission’s work. We will continue to explore the appropriate role for the United States and the leadership within Europe, in order to come to a policy that will carry out our objectives of stopping the atrocities that are taking place and lead to a solution to the problems of the republics of the former Yugoslavia.

We thank each of you for your testimony and the Commission will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned at 4:45 p.m.]
The Helsinki Commission has convened this hearing to take a more thorough look at the potential spillover effects of the Yugoslav conflict, which is today characterized mostly by the aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In doing so, I hope that we and our distinguished witnesses can cover three important aspects of this issue:

First, direct spillover. What are the risks for fighting to erupt in areas neighboring or close to Bosnia-Herzegovina? The most likely candidates are the UN protected areas of Croatia, still occupied by Serb militants; the Muslim-inhabited Sandzak region of Serbia and Montenegro and the Albanian-inhabited Kosovo, and Macedonia. The eruption of violence in these and other areas could be either premeditated or spontaneous, and could also potentially trigger the involvement of other countries which neighbor them.

Second, the broader impact of Yugoslavia's violent disintegration on the Balkans. Economically, it has severely disrupted transport, created a massive refugee problem, and, by the need to impose sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, caused some neighboring countries additional economic hardship during a critical time of reform. Socially, aspects of the Yugoslav conflict and crisis are the preoccupation of many neighboring societies, and in all likelihood has encouraged nationalism and ethnic tensions among them as well.

Third, why should we care about either direct spillover or the broader impact. While the fact that genocide is taking place morally and legally obligates us to become involved, it is important to know what U.S. interests, if any, in the Balkans are, and how vital these interests are considered to be. If the conflict does spread, how will these interests be affected? What does the current international policy -- a lot of motion but little real action -- mean for the future of the NATO alliance? What does it mean for new global balances in the post-Cold War world?

Our witnesses today will address these important questions. First, we have Stephen Oxman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, who can explain current U.S. policy and what we and the Europeans are doing to contain the conflict, through the CSCE or otherwise. We also hope to hear a description of U.S. interests in the Balkan region as seen by the Clinton Administration.
Second, we have Janusz Bugajski of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and John Lampe of the Woodrow Wilson Center, who will each present their views on the potential for spillover, directly and broadly. Both have extensive background and firsthand observations of developments in the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans as a whole. Finally, we have Paul Warnke, who has had a distinguished career in U.S. Government dealing with foreign policy, defense and arms control issues. He is well qualified to look at the potential for spillover in terms of U.S. interests in Europe, and has recently written on the Bosnian conflict from the point of view of NATO's role in a post-Cold War Europe.

To conclude, I must say that as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission I have myself been deeply involved in congressional efforts regarding the Yugoslav conflict, travelling there, holding hearings, meeting with people, and trying to get resolutions on the issue passed. As a result, I come to this hearing with some views on the matter already, and I would sum them up this way. There is considerable risk of spillover, and to some extent it is already occurring. It may not get out of hand, but it easily could. And while the international community have taken considerable efforts to deter the movement of conflict through missions and additional UN force deployments, it has also made the situation worse by rewarding rather than stopping aggression in the first place, specifically in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By rewarding the aggressors through the carve-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we encourage them to go for more, and our warnings to the contrary increasingly lack credibility. In short, I believe we have hidden behind the veil of multilateralism as an excuse for not exerting strong leadership. Our failure and the absolute failure of our allies to take serious action against the aggressor has made the task of containment all the more difficult. If we feel the risks of spillover are great and our interests are affected by this risk, then our policy is extremely disturbing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding this.
REPRESENTATIVE STENY H. HOYER
CoChairman, Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe

"The Yugoslav Conflict: Potential for Spillover in the Balkans"
A Hearing before the Helsinki Commission
July 21, 1993
IT IS A PLEASURE TO JOIN OUR CHAIRMAN, SENATOR DECONCINI, IN WELCOMING SUCH A DISTINGUISHED PANEL OF EXPERTS TO THIS HEARING ON THE POTENTIAL FOR SPILLOVER IN THE BALKANS OF THE ONGOING TRAGIC WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, IN MY OPINION, IS A CLASSIC MODEL OF A FAILURE AT COLLECTIVE SECURITY. THIS IS A HUMAN CATASTROPHIE OF MAJOR PROPORTIONS THAT WILL HAVE OUR ERA OF HIGH DEMOCRATIC EXPECTATIONS IN EUROPE AND AROUND THE WORLD GO DOWN IN HISTORY AS A RETURN TO BARBARISM. NOR IS THAT THE END OF THE STORY. HISTORIANS WILL FOOTNOTE THAT WE WATCHED IT HAPPEN -- WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTENT AND SCOPE OF THE BARBARITY -- AND FAILED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO STOP IT. WE HAVE NOT BEEN PREPARED, AS EVENTUALLY WE WERE FOR SOMALIA, TO TAKE ACTION PREMISED ON MORAL IMPERATIVES. NOR DID WE BELIEVE AS WITH THE CASE OF KUWAIT THAT IMPORTANT NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS WERE AT STAKE.

INDEED, THE REEMERGENCE OF SO-CALLED "ANCIENT HATRED" HAS DONE MORE TO THROW COLD WATER ON THE POST-COLD WAR EUPHORIA THAN I WITNESSED IN 1990 THAN ANYTHING ELSE I CAN THINK OF. BUT WHILE HATRED MAY BE ANCIENT, IS THEIR REEMERGENCE NOW TRULY INEVITABLE, AS SOME ANALYSTS AND COMMENTATORS WOULD SEEM TO HAVE US BELIEVE? IN FACT, IN MANY PLACES WHERE ETHNIC DISPUTES NOW REIGN, EVEN IN PLACES LIKE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, THERE HAVE BEEN LONG PERIODS OF TOLERANCE AND ACCOMMODATION AMONG DIVERSE GROUPS OF PEOPLE. AFTER ALL IT WAS JUST A FEW YEARS AGO THAT SARAJEVO, A CITY THAT SEEMED TO COMBINE PEACEFULLY DIVERSE RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC, AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES, PROVIDED AN ALMOST IDYLIC SETTING FOR THE OLYMPICS. YET THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES OF EASTERN EUROPE IS OFTEN DEFINED, ESPECIALLY OF LATE, BY THEIR PERIODS OF CONFLICT RATHER THAN BY THEIR PERIODS OF HARMONY, THEREBY SUGGESTING THAT REEMERGENCE OF HISTORIC CONFLICTS MAY BE INEVITABLE. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT THEY ARE LIKELY, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE INEVITABLE.

THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA HAS BEEN LED BY NATIONALISTS, INTOLERANT OF THOSE NEIGHBORS OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES. RELIGIOUS MOTIVES HAVE COME TO PLAY A PART IN THIS BRUTAL WAR AGAINST CIVILIANS - BUT LET THERE BE NO MISTAKE AS TO THE OVERRIDING MOTIVATION - THAT OF POWER. ONE SHOULD NOT UNDERSTATE THE ROLE OF POWER-MAD DEMAGOGUES AND MEGALOMANIACS IN FOSTERING ETHNIC TENSION FOR THEIR OWN ENDS IN MANY OF THE CONFLICTED AREAS IN THE CSCE REGION. JUST AS STALIN AND TITO PROMOTED AN IDEOLOGY OF UNITY IN ORDER TO BETTER ENTRENCH THEIR REGIMES, TODAY'S MILOSEVICS'
PROMOTE AN IDEOLOGY OF HATRED AND DIVISION TO PROMOTE THEIR OWN DICTATORSHIPS.

AND LET ME POINT OUT HERE THAT YOU DO NOT NEED NATIONALISTS ON ALL SIDES FOR THIS TO HAPPEN. IT IS SERBIAN NATIONALISM FOLLOWED BY CROATIAN NATIONALISM - AND NOT MUSLIM NATIONALISM OR ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM -- THAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS WAR.

WHILE I RECOGNIZE THAT "ANCIENT HATREDS," HISTORIC ETHNIC PROBLEMS, OR THEIR RESIDUAL, CONTEMPORARY PREJUDICES EXIST, IT IS THE CREATION OF A POWER VACUUM WITH THE DEMISE OF COMMUNISM THAT TO A LARGE DEGREE PERMITS THE VIOLENCE UNDERLINING POLICIES SUCH AS ETHNIC CLEANSING. WITHIN THIS POWER VACUUM OPPRESSIVE LEADERS HAVE EMERGED WHO ARE ALL TOO HAPPY TO EXPLOIT HISTORIC FEUDS IN ORDER TO PORTRAY THEMSELVES AS THE CHAMPIONS OF ONE ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, OR LINGUISTIC GROUP AGAINST ANOTHER. WHEN THE COMINTERN EMPIRE COLLAPSED, LEADERS LIKE MILOSEVIC, LIKE CROATIA'S TUDJMAN, AND LIKE MANY EXTREMISTS IN RUSSIA, SLOVAKIA, AND ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, ALL OF WHOM ARE FORMER COMMUNISTS -- TURNED TO NATIONALIST RHETORIC TO LATCH ONTO POWER. SEEKING THE EXACT SAME GOALS THEY SOUGHT AS PARTY LEADERS YET BURDENED BY AN IDEOLOGY TOO DISCREDITED TO DO THEM ANY GOOD, THEY TURNED TO NATIONALIST RHETORIC TO BOLSTER THEIR CLAIMS.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS IS THAT WHILE IT'S PERFECTLY FINE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SEEK TO ADDRESS ETHNIC INTOLERANCE IN THIS REGION THROUGH EDUCATION PROGRAMS, DEMOCRACY BUILDING SEMINARS, AND SIMILAR THINGS THAT THE CSCE COMMUNITY IS INDEED UNDERTAKING, WE MUST ALSO RESPOND TO PEOPLE LIKE MILOSEVIC AS THE DICTATORS THAT THEY REALLY ARE. IN CAPITALIZING ON ETHNIC TENSIONS FOR THEIR OWN PERSONAL GAIN IN MANY OF THE AREAS OF CONFLICT IN THE CSCE REGION THESE PEOPLE ARE ULTIMATELY CULPABLE FOR THE HAVOC THEY WREAK.

IF WE CAN SEE THESE KINDS OF CONFLICTS MORE AS I THINK THEY REALLY ARE -- STRUGGLES OVER POWER AND MONEY AND LAND, AS WELL AS AVENUES FOR ADDRESSING REAL OR PERCEIVED HISTORIC GRIEVANCES -- THEN I THINK WE CAN SEE MORE CLEARLY WHAT'S AT STAKE WHEN WE FAIL TO ACT. THE SLAUGHTER CONTINUES INDEED INTENSIFIES AS THE STAKES BECOME HIGHER. IT CAUSES TENSIONS TO SPREAD AS OTHERS WONDER IF THEY WILL BE THE NEXT VICTIMS AS OTHERS ACT TO PROTECT THEIR OWN INTERESTS WHILE OTHERS SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES THE CHAOS OFFERS. EITHER BY DESIGN OR BECAUSE OF THE
INSTABILITY THESE "UNCHECKED" TENSIONS CAUSE, SOMEONE, SOMEWHERE, LIKELY WILL BE NEXT, POTENTIALLY TRIGGERING A MUCH WIDER INVOLVEMENT OR PERHAPS PRECIPITATING A BALKAN WAR.

IN THE CASE OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF MILOSEVIC. PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND CEASE-FIRES WERE NOTHING MORE THAN TACTICAL MANEUVERS BY WHICH TIME WAS SOUGHT SO THAT GAINS COULD BE SOLIDIFIED AND ADDITIONAL TERRITORY SECURED. AT THE PRECISE MOMENT THAT AGREEMENT IS REACHED ONE COULD EXPECT SERBIAN MORTAR SHELLS TO FALL. AT SOME POINT WE SHOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT IN CONFRONTING VIOLENCE CREDIBLE THREATS OF RETALIATION WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE.

THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA HAS UNDERMINED THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, SERIOUSLY CALLED INTO QUESTION THE WILLINGNESS OF DEMOCRACIES TO BACK UP STATED COMMITMENTS TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY WITH EFFECTIVE ACTION, AND DILUTED THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE LESSON IS A BITTER ONE: AGGRESSION WILL BE TOLERATED.

AND THE QUESTION THE COMMISSION IS EXAMINING TODAY IS THE LIKELIHOOD OF THAT VIOLENCE SPREADING TO OTHER AREAS AND WHAT WILL BE THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

I THINK EUROPE HAS FAILED AND WE HAVE FAILED IN EUROPE.

WE SPEAK OF FORMING THE POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER -- YET THE EVENTS IN BOSNIA-UNQUESTIONABLY INDICATE THAT THE WORST OF THE OLD ORDER HAS BEEN REPLACED BY DEMAGOGUES LIBERATED BY THE END OF THE COLD WAR. IF WE PERMIT THESE PEOPLE TO PREVAIL, THE NEW ERA WILL BE SHAPED BY THE VOICES OF VIOLENCE AND VENGEANCE AND NOT BY THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY. IN MY VIEW THIS LAST ASPECT WILL BE THE HALLMARK OF ANY NEW WORLD ORDER, BUT IT IS ONE THAT I FEAR WILL NOT MARK THE ONE THAT IS EVOLVING.
Co-Chairmen DeConcini and Hoyer,

First, I would like to thank you for allowing me to participate in this hearing, I applaud the efforts of this committee to examine the potential for, and consequences of, a larger Balkan war. Throughout this crisis, your work on behalf of all victims of aggression have been integral to keeping the world focussed on finding a solution.

Like Senator DeConcini, I have had the opportunity to visit the region recently, and was appalled at what I saw there. Throughout Croatia, Bosnia and Kosova, casualties of Serbian ultra-nationalism and militaristic aggression were epidemic. The victims of Serbia’s drive for an ethnically pure region which I met during my recent fact-finding mission have compelled me to participate in important events like this today.

While visiting in April, I discovered that the spillover -- whose potential you are now debating -- has really already occurred and is escalating daily. For example, the Serbian government’s recent decision
to not renew the mandate of the CSCE human rights monitors in Kosova and Sandzak (SAN-JACK) is clearly another sign of Belgrade's desire to steadily increase tensions until the local population responds. When this occurs, the Serbs will have an excuse to wipe out those areas not already ethnically cleansed.

To counter this threat, the Clinton Administration has deployed three hundred American troops to the region hoping to send a "signal" to Serbia. It appears the President hopes this "signal" will stop a government that has killed an estimated 200,000 people, left another 2 million homeless, broken most international agreements they have entered into, and whose leaders have been accused of ordering systematic rape, ethnic cleansing and other war crimes.

In my opinion, it has been the Albanian majority in Kosova leading a campaign of peaceful resistance against Serbian harassment -- and not the half-hearted attempts by the international community -- that has kept the conflict from spreading. While the Serbian government has tried to provoke the Albanians into starting a fight -- to their credit they have resisted -- the CSCE monitors in Kosova have acted as a pressure valve to relieve tensions on both sides. Serbian expulsion of the monitors now paves the way for ethnic cleansing to be carried out like that in Bosnia.
In June, I introduced two amendments calling on the President to push the U.N. and the CSCE to more than double monitors currently operating in Kosova and to place peacekeepers there. The House of Representatives supported these amendments recognizing the necessary mission of the monitors and that new assaults on the Kosovars could draw Turkey and Albania into the conflict.

I believe that a completely different approach to the Balkan crisis is needed. I believe Serbia will continue to gamble on the lack of Western resolve and that 300 American troops in Macedonia are not going to cross the border to save the people of Kosova. Like the Bosnians, the Kosovars will not survive any more empty gestures. I feel strongly that the Serbians must comply with international monitoring to bring an end to the apartheid system in Kosova, including opening the schools and hospitals, and rehiring workers fired for ethnic reasons. And if the Serbs continue to destabilize the region, there should be consequences including air strikes against strategic targets and supply lines.

I am very interested to hear from the panelists on their insight to what approach we should take regarding this crisis.
Thus far, our approach to dealing with Serbia only gives the green light for instability around the world. Serbia’s actions over the past two years in the Balkans have made a mockery of previously unassailable doctrines, such as the non-acceptance of borders changed through force, the defense of democracy over communism, or the even inexcusability of genocide. These doctrines had been the international laws that provided security and stability for the world community. If Serbia’s aggression is rewarded and allowed to escalate even further, then international leaders will be forced to deal with dozens of Serbia’s throughout the world.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Commission today to discuss with you the potential for spillover of the Bosnian conflict, and more generally the impact that conflict has had in the Balkans.

As you know, prevention of a wider Balkan war has been one of this Administration's principal goals. The Balkans are still the powderkeg of Europe. If the present conflict were to spread to Kosovo, or to Macedonia, or elsewhere, the entire region could be destabilized. Other countries, including NATO allies, might be drawn into the fighting, with grave consequences for European security. Finally, a wider conflict would set back the Balkan countries' efforts to build democracies and market economies.

In my remarks I will first discuss some of the ways in which the present conflict could spread and why a wider conflict could affect important U.S. interests. I will then explain what steps are being taken by the U.S. and the international community to prevent the conflict from spreading. Finally, I will describe what we are doing to encourage the broader trends towards democracy and free markets in this region.

The potential for spillover flows from the ethnic geography of the Balkans. The Balkan nations are not homogeneous, but contain intermingled ethnic, religious, and national groups. As the Serbian nationalists constantly remind us, there are Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia as well as in Serbia. There are Hungarians in Serbia and Romania; there are Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia; and I could give many more examples.

This ethnic tinderbox can ignite if political leaders fan the flames of nationalism and irredentism. Calls for a Greater Serbia, for example, are founded upon the claim that Serbian minorities can only be protected by union with Serbia proper. We believe that the rights of national minorities must be protected and respected, and we oppose any attempts to change national borders by force. But our policy in this troubled region must take account of the powerful emotional impact these calls for ethnic solidarity carry.
Let me give you an update on some of the situations where the conflict might expand:

**Croatia**

The threat in Croatia does not come from spillover as such but from a possible intensification of the conflict between the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serbs in the Krajina, who now control approximately one-quarter of the country. As you will recall, in 1991 there was fierce fighting between the Serbs and Croats. The international community has been trying to mediate a settlement, but without much success to date, although international mediation helped to defuse, at least for the moment, a potential crisis last weekend when the Croatian government rebuilt a bridge linking southern Dalmatia to the rest of the country. President Tudjman recently agreed to extend the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force in Croatia for another three months. The situation remains extremely tense, however, and widespread fighting could erupt at any time.

**Kosovo and Macedonia**

Our principal concern in Kosovo is that the Serbian government might crack down violently, either in furtherance of a program of "ethnic cleansing," or in reaction to provocative actions by ethnic Albanian nationalists in Kosovo. Fighting could also be generated by extremist Serbian nationalist groups which have bases of operation in the region. Violence could lead to a flow of refugees into Macedonia, upsetting and destabilizing that country. Fighting in Kosovo might also spread to Macedonia and Albania if combatants retreat or seek refuge across the border in those countries, or if ethnic Albanians from the region seek to aid their brethren in Kosovo. Finally, we cannot totally discount the possibility of a Serbian invasion of Macedonia on the pretext of protecting the Serbian minority there.

However, the atmosphere in Kosovo today appears stable, although tense. While we do not believe that violence is imminent, an unexpected incident could still trigger an eruption at any time. The number of potentially dangerous incidents has increased in recent weeks since Serbia announced its intention to terminate the CSCE monitoring mission. I will talk later about our efforts to reverse Serbia's decision and have the monitoring mission continue.
Sandjak and Vojvodina

Sandjak and Vojvodina are less immediately explosive than Kosovo and Croatia. However, minority populations in both regions have been subjected to Serbian harassment and intimidation. For example, the Muslim minority in Sandjak has suffered beatings and shootings at the hands of local Serbian officials and paramilitary groups. In Vojvodina, a "quiet" ethnic cleansing campaign has been waged against the ethnic Hungarian population. Because the Serbian authorities have replaced local law enforcement and judicial personnel in Vojvodina with Serbs, ethnic Hungarians in the region feel that they no longer have the protection of the law and are vulnerable to threats and violence.

So far, the Serbs' activities in Vojvodina and Sandjak have not been conducted on a wide scale. However, in both regions, we are concerned that the present activities are merely a prelude to a more aggressive campaign of ethnic cleansing. Indeed many members of the minority population in both regions have already fled.

Any of these situations has the potential to lead to a wider conflict that could more broadly affect European security and American interests in a variety of ways:

-- Refugees may flee from wider violence to neighboring states. Already there are over 2.5 million refugees from the countries of the former Yugoslavia. A new flood of refugees would strain the limited resources of the Balkan states and could have a destabilizing influence.

-- Neighboring states may be drawn in to protect their ethnic brethren directly or indirectly, or may be tempted to take advantage of the tumult to press territorial claims. Broader fighting in this region, which includes two of our NATO Allies, would be extremely dangerous for European security.

-- A widening of the conflict might deal a death blow to the other Balkan nations that are currently trying to make the difficult transition to multi-ethnic democratic states. I will return to this point shortly.

-- If we are unable to prevent a wider conflict, would-be aggressors, bigots and extreme nationalists will be encouraged to foment violence in other areas, and the credibility of the U.S. and the international community may be damaged.
Because of these dangers, the U.S., acting unilaterally and through international organizations such as the UN and the CSCE, has acted on several fronts to prevent spillover.

In Kosovo:

-- We have called upon the Serbian authorities to stop repression of the Albanian minority, to avoid the use of force, and to restore the region's autonomy. We have also met with Dr. Rugova, the Albanian Kosovar leader, to reinforce our publicly stated opposition to full independence for Kosovo.

-- We are providing $5 million in humanitarian aid to Kosovo, for food and other essential commodities.

-- We have warned Milosevic that we are prepared to respond to conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian actions.

-- We have inspired, supported and participated in the CSCE long duration mission in Serbia-Montenegro. Until recently, there were 10 CSCE monitors in Kosovo, four of whom were American. As you know, in the Joint Action Program we called for an increase in the number of monitors. However, the Serbian government has recently indicated that it will terminate the mission.

The international community is convinced that the CSCE monitoring mission should continue and the number of monitors be increased. The presence of the monitors has caused a substantial reduction in human rights abuses, specifically police harassment and brutality. Because the monitors investigate complaints swiftly and impartially, they defuse tensions and prevent sparks from becoming fires. The monitors have also given the international community its own "eyes and ears" in Kosovo, to verify or disprove alleged abuses.

You are probably aware that Secretary Christopher sent a message to Milosevic urging him to extend the mission and to accept a significant increase in the number of monitors. The Secretary told Milosevic that we viewed his failure to extend the mission with the utmost seriousness. Others, including Russia and the EC, have made similar demarches. The CSCE has met with representatives of Serbia and Montenegro to press for the mission's extension. We are also working with the CSCE to bring this matter before the UN Security Council, because Milosevic's action clearly increases the risk of a wider conflict in the region. We will continue to urge Milosevic to permit the monitors to remain, as a substantial contribution to lessening tension in the area. If he fails to do so, the CSCE will look for other ways to monitor the region.
The CSCE mission has also been operating in Sandjak and Vojvodina. If the mission is terminated, the monitors in those regions will also leave. Our efforts are directed at getting Milosevic to accept an extension of these monitors as well.

Let me now turn to Macedonia. Several weeks ago, I had the privilege of briefing the Congress on the President's decision to offer U.S. forces to augment the United Nations contingent in Macedonia. Deployment of these forces is now complete. Approximately 330 American soldiers have joined the 700 Nordic UNPROFOR troops already in Macedonia.

After a month of training, our troops will be rotated periodically to the border between Macedonia and Kosovo, to monitor the border for destabilizing activity and to watch for sanctions violations. Based upon the current situation, we do not believe that our troops face imminent hostilities. Their presence, however, should serve as a deterrent to a wider conflict.

In addition, since September the CSCE has maintained a long-duration mission in Skopje to defuse tensions and monitor the situation on the ground. The U.S. has provided the chief of this mission since its inception.

In Croatia, approximately 13,000 UN peacekeeping troops have been in place since mid-1992. The mandate of these peacekeeping forces was recently extended, with the consent of the Croatian government, for another three months. While the UNPROFOR troops have been unable to stop the fighting completely or to bring about a peaceful return of Croatian authority in the territories held by Croatian Serbs, they have succeeded in limiting the fighting. Nonetheless, armed conflict and shelling continue from time to time and the situation remains very unstable.

Finally, we are encouraging the parties to the present conflict to reach a negotiated settlement. A negotiated settlement agreed upon by all the parties is the best way to end the conflict and prevent it from spreading.

As you noted in announcing this hearing, however, the Yugoslav conflict has already had "a major impact in other Balkan countries economically, politically and socially." The new democracies in the Balkans watch the bloody conflict in Bosnia -- which set out to be a multi-ethnic, democratic state embracing Western values -- at the same time that they themselves are attempting the difficult task of becoming multi-ethnic, democratic states embracing Western values. The conflict in Bosnia encourages the voices of intolerance and reaction throughout the region; a wider conflict would endanger the new democracies in the Balkans when they are most vulnerable.
Turning to the economic effects of the conflict, the Balkan democracies, which border on Serbia, deserve much of the credit for the effectiveness of U.N. sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. But their enforcement of these sanctions costs them dearly -- costs that their economies, which already suffer from underdevelopment and the stultifying effects of four decades of Communism, cannot easily absorb. The sanctions have deprived them of traditional export markets and have isolated them in varying degrees both from each other and from new markets they are trying to develop in Western Europe. And the huge profits available to persons willing to violate the sanctions strain the integrity of law enforcement institutions.

We are supporting the sanctions enforcement efforts of the front-line states through the operation of Sanctions Assistance Missions under the auspices of the CSCE and the European Community. 187 customs officers from 26 countries operate alongside the local customs services to oversee and advise on sanctions enforcement, and to provide technical assistance and training. 27 of the monitors are American. The presence of the sanctions missions gives us the ability to monitor and improve sanctions enforcement and keeps the international community informed of problems. The missions' reports provided the basis for needed UN Security Council action to strengthen and tighten the effectiveness of the embargo.

Apart from the impact of sanctions, the Yugoslav conflict has had other negative economic effects on the region. The bitter war in a neighboring country frightens away prospective foreign investors from the Balkan democracies, which urgently need outside capital to fuel the expansion of their emerging open-market economies. And national insecurity may impel the new democracies to allocate funds to military use which they cannot afford to divert from weakened public administration and social services.

The picture for these emerging Balkan democracies is not entirely gloomy, however. Notwithstanding conditions which would have crushed the spirit of less resilient peoples, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovenia have shown dogged persistence in pursuing programs of political and economic reform and reconstruction which have already made great progress. This is a face of the Balkans of which many Americans are unaware. But I believe it is central to long-term success for U.S. policy in the region.

The Balkan democracies remind us of a number of important lessons. They show that democratic institutions are the best means to channel ethnic, religious, and other conflicts into the political process. They demonstrate that democratic values
and institutions can take root and flourish even in places where conventional wisdom discounts their prospects. And they provide welcome evidence that democratic development internally can promote cooperative regional relations, even among historic adversaries. These lessons are applicable throughout the world.

The foundation of our policy in the Balkans, therefore, must be to support the continued development of democratic institutions, free-market economies, and open societies, and ultimately to integrate these nations into a European security system. In the immediate future, we intend to foster democratic development in the region through the following mutually reinforcing means:

-- We will maintain our engagement and dialogue with the Balkan democracies, both bilaterally and through the CSCE, to continue to nurture the democratic and market reforms they have successfully begun;

-- We will work to increase US and European trade with and investment in the Balkan countries. The Administration has proposed that Romania be granted Most Favored Nation status, an important step in helping that country's economy;

-- We will promote economic interdependence and integration both among the Balkan democracies and between them and the West;

-- Through cultural and educational exchanges and by working with non-governmental groups such as businesses and private voluntary organizations, we hope to mobilize the immense interest and resources present at the grass roots in America in order to link the U.S. and Balkans together in a dense web of relationships;

-- Finally, we will continue to use our assistance programs to support our goals in this region. Our principal means for helping the Balkan democracies is the Support for Eastern European Democracies Act, or SEED. Since Congress passed the SEED Act in 1989, we have provided over $150 million to Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, and some countries of the former Yugoslavia, to assist them in developing democratic institutions, changing to free market economies, and improving the quality of life. For example, under the SEED programs support for democracy alone we have provided schoolbooks free of propaganda, equipment and training for independent media, support for new trade unions and political parties, and technical assistance for parliamentary institutions. We must continue the SEED program to help these countries in future years. And we must also encourage our European allies to do their part in providing aid and opening markets to the countries of this region.
These policies can greatly advance our goal of bringing long-term stability to the Balkans. The best vaccine against the plague of war is prosperity and democracy. I want to underscore the Administration's conviction that the Balkans tomorrow need not look like Bosnia today. The future will not be dictated by the gun barrels of violent nationalists or aggressors. It is being made now by those individuals and groups who are working with patience and determination for democracy, open markets, and ethnic tolerance. Working together with international organizations, we hope to contain the present conflict so as to permit these forces of moderation to triumph throughout the region.

Thank you. I'd be pleased to answer any questions that you have.
Statement of Paul C. Warnke
for the Helsinki Commission
Hearing, July 21, 1993

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION:

You have asked for my views regarding American interests in
the post-Cold War Europe and how these interests might be
affected if the present Balkan conflict were to spread. You have
also asked me to comment on the role the NATO alliance should
play in ending the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia,
particularly in Bosnia.

Back in November, 1991, at a meeting in Rome, the NATO
foreign ministers gave what I believe to be the proper analysis
of these questions. They declared that, with the end of the
Soviet threat, the real risks to allied security would arise from
"the serious economic, social and political difficulties,
including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are
faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe." However,
when confronted with the actuality of this anticipated post-Cold
War threat, NATO has failed to respond with anything other than
rhetoric.

Ironically, the NATO defense ministers, meeting in Brussels
on May 26 of this year, called for an end to reductions in the
military budgets of alliance members, noting that: "A stabiliza-
tion of defense expenditures, as well as a more effective use of
our national and collective resources, are necessary to enable.
the alliance to respond in a timely and effective way to the challenges of the future." But if NATO refuses to put its muscle where its mouth is, it's hard to see what we are spending our money for and why the alliance should survive. We are now confronted with just the sort of security threat for which NATO action is the best, if not the only, solution.

The Serbian aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, to a lesser extent, Croatian complicity in it, has left NATO inert. The proposals that have been advocated, such as safe havens for the Muslim population, or the partition of Bosnia into ethnic enclaves, are no solution at all and could readily lead to further ethnic purges in an area of Europe characterized by states with a dazzling ethnic mix. Kosovo is an Albanian-populated enclave in Serbia. Macedonia is inhabited by Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbs and other ethnic minorities. Hungarians are dispersed all over what were the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires.

Outside of the former Yugoslavia, in various of the former Soviet republics, people of differing cultural and genetic roots will either learn to live together or will massacre one another for reasons that have nothing to do with any pragmatic conflicts of interests. The very concept of the ethnic state is inconsistent with any sensible or sustainable world order.
In a recent speech here in Washington, Richard von Weizsacker, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, contrasted what is happening today in former Yugoslavia with the proper concept of a nation in today’s world: "Cultural competition in a free society and across open frontiers works as a stimulating and unifying element. As we are sadly observing, it can, when used as an instrument for pretended superiority, exclusiveness and power turn into a cause for separation, hatred and even extermination. Culture guarded, defined and enshrined by national frontiers is a contradiction in terms to the culture we know and cherish: open, alive and international."

Nor is it true that the incalculable human tragedy in Bosnia is the inevitable consequence of ancient hatreds. For generations, Serbs, Croats and Muslims have been able to live together in peace. What we are seeing today is the product of divisive and deceitful propaganda by rapacious leaders bent on enlarging their own spheres of domination regardless of the cost in human lives and misery.

NATO, led as necessary by strong U.S. prodding, must make it clear that murderous thuggery will not be tolerated and will instead be punished. Unless it does so, the alliance is a costly anachronism. It is, in my view, absurd to contend, as some of its members do, that NATO can do nothing because it was not intended to engage in military action "out of area." What used
to be Yugoslavia has NATO countries to the east and to the south as well as to the west. If ethnic homogeneity is to be accepted as a prime criterion for statehood, then Europe can never be at peace and western European economic integration will not be sufficient to bring about prosperity and progress. For the western nations, including the United States, the resulting chaos will prevent the development of lucrative markets for our products and our technology.

I can take no comfort in the suggestions that Bosnia is a distant land or that this is a pot-and-kettle war where every one is at fault. We have seen in the past -- as when Nazi Germany invaded Czechoslovakia -- that such assertions only succeeded in postponing action to stop aggression until the task of doing so had become exponentially more difficult.

It is, regrettably, quite late in the game. With the advantage of hindsight, the international recognition of states seceding from Yugoslavia was premature and should have been preceded by negotiations designed to protect minority rights. Even then, a strong warning by the United States and its western allies against Serbian aggression might have frightened off that country's bully boys at an early stage. I can sympathize with the reluctance to initiate military action that may result in a long-term and even escalating engagement. But if aggression is allowed to go unchecked and unpunished in Europe, then NATO
members, including the United States, will find themselves at some point down the line involved in a wider war that might have been stifled in its incipiency.

I believe we should call on NATO’s military leaders to prepare, and pronounce a program for military intervention including, if necessary, the virtual occupation of Bosnia. Isolated or token military action is unlikely to help and could further endanger the United Nations peacekeeping forces. The more substantial the NATO military forces are, the less military opposition they will encounter and the greater the chance that political opposition within Serbia and Croatia may lead to more responsible governments. The program should be designed to break the siege of Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities and, if NATO forces meet with Serbian or Croatian resistance, to attack military targets of the aggressors within their own national borders.

The moral imperative is clear. The security threat is real. The time for action is now.
YUGOSLAV SPILLOVERS: PROSPECTS OF A WIDER WAR
AND PROBLEMS WITH SANCTIONS

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The arrival of 320 U.S. troops in Macedonia has helped, one hopes, to refocus American attention on the fateful consequences that the tragic war in the former Yugoslavia holds for the international community if left to proceed on its own. This meeting reflects the possibility, rather than the widespread perception here or in Southeastern Europe, that the United States has placed this small unit in Macedonia with the larger purpose of serving as a trip wire that will bring further forces to bear on any Serbian effort to move against the Albanian population of Kosovo (over 90 percent of the total) or of Macedonia itself (some 30-35 percent of the total).

Recent visits to Sofia and to Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana in the former Yugoslavia combine with the recent reporting on Macedonia by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Research Institute to convince me that this small U.S. contingent will not now have the deterrent effect that any U.S. presence would have had earlier in the conflict. No one I met in the region expects any decisive military intervention under any circumstances from the U.S., the U.N., or NATO. That is the bad news. The good news, at least for the time being, is that no one expects a wider war in Kosovo or Macedonia either. Let me spell out the reasons for such “optimism” before going on to the way in which sanctions against Serbia are hurting rather than helping the prospects for peace and democracy throughout the region. I will conclude by arguing that those sanctions be
both tightened and relaxed.

The reasons that no wider war impends may be found in Belgrade and also in Macedonia. The Milošević regime itself has not turned more toward radical nationalism nor lost ground to the Radical Party of Vojislav Šešelj. The regime’s difficulties with Radovan Karadžić and the Bosnian Serbs over the latter’s failure to accept the Vance-Owen Plan were real and reflect a loss of close control, maybe even of close relations. The subsequent dismissal of Dobrica Ćosić as President by Milošević’s parliament and the arrest and vicious beating of opposition leader Vuk Dašković and his wife by Milošević’s police, probably by a special unit called up from Kosovo for the occasion, were not concessions to Šešelj or other radicals. They were a calculated effort to tighten Milošević’s own hold on political power, his primary aim all along. They reflect a growing reliance on the police, now reportedly 70,000, rather than the army, perhaps 80,000 and of doubtful capacity to fight, even in Kosovo. The pretext for Ćosić’s long-awaited removal was reportedly a remark he made to army leaders questioning the growing size of the police.

Why would Milošević risk using that doubtful army force in Kosovo when his police already hold its population under strict martial law? Why would the disciplined Albanian political organization of Ibrahim Rugova in Kosovo risk the fate of the Bosnian Moslems when no serious prospect of Western assistance impends? Turning to Macedonia, why would Milošević respond to the Šešelj-led efforts to demand rights for the Serbian minority there when his regime already receives the one valuable commodity that Macedonia can provide - oil shipments in defiance of U.N. sanctions? The Macedonian government does not encourage or condone these
shipments but their movement is out of its limited control. Neither the ethnic Macedonian majority nor the large Albanian minority in Macedonia would accept a Serbian invasion without a fight, and as poorly armed as they are, they would provide real opposition to Serbian forces whose morale and training is questionable.

I therefore reject not only the tight link that is presumed and once did bind the Bosnian Serbs to Belgrade but also the corollary that the pending partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina is a victory for Greater Serbia West that will now prompt the pursuit of Greater Serbia South. I do not however accept the idea that there is nothing for the United States to do, given the clear popular and also military mandate not to commit ground troops to one side in an ongoing civil war. We can begin by helping the Bosnian Moslems to drive the hardest, best protected bargain they can with Serb and Croat forces that cannot be trusted to honor agreements without fear of military punishment, air strikes included. The Croatian military presence in Hercegovina started too soon and included too many misdeeds against civilians, first Serbs and now Muslims, to be called opportunism or to qualify as potential allies in a mythical multinational force. Instead the U.S. should consider seconding the warning of trade sanctions against Croatia, to be delivered this week by the EC Foreign Ministers, as economic pressure to encourage the Croatian government to do what many people in Zagreb want it to do: end the presence of Croatian army units in Hercegovina and cut off support for a regime that has dirtied its hands with ethnic cleansing. Such a step would surely strengthen Croatia's case for international support in negotiations over its own Serb-occupied territory.
What would help to drive a harder bargain with the Bosnian Serbs, who still bear the responsibility for starting the war and for committing the most misdeeds? My answer may be surprising; I will also argue that it is far reaching, promising to affect neighboring countries in a positive way. We urgently need to reexamine the effect of the sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro and to change them in two ways. First, the restrictions on petroleum products and any attendant financial transactions need to be tightened. This is the one military supply on which the Bosnian Serbs depend on breaking the sanctions. A chance was lost when the international community did not make the Milošević regime an offer it could not refuse in joining to seal the Serbian-Bosnian border to such shipments this past spring. Let us now seal the Macedonian-Serbian border to such supplies. There are already rumors in Belgrade that the U.S. troops are in Macedonia to prepare for just such a process. The West will indeed have to help. But such a process is conceivable for Macedonia authorities only if a second sort of change is made in the sanctions that affect not only the former Yugoslavia but also all the surrounding countries.

That second change is to lift sanctions on every manufacture, raw material or spare part even remotely connected to supply of food and medicine. Their present supposed exemption of food and medicine per se is resulting instead in the near total exclusion of medicine from Serbia and the blockade of Bulgarian, Greek and Macedonian foodstuffs from reaching the European markets on which they depend. Recently, an extraordinary congress of Serbian doctors convened in Belgrade to detail the horrors that the absence of spare parts, medical equipment and pharmaceutical raw materials are visiting on the local population. (Three clinics in Belgrade are...
completely out of medicine, food, and detergent.) The doctors lamented not only the needless deaths, including babies needing operations, and empty hospital beds that now ensue, but also the comfort that regime propaganda takes from publicizing the "unjust sanctions" that cause them. Now winter is coming and hospitals heated to 45 degrees Fahrenheit as the rest of Belgrade is promised after November will only fuel more propaganda. The rest of the sanctions plus the bankruptcy of the regime's own economic policies will serve to keep plenty of economic pressure on the regime, most easily seen in an inflation rate of 500 percent since last month.

I conclude with some comment on the benefits that would accrue to the democratic transitions underway in neighboring countries if sanctions were lifted in every area related to medicine or foodstuffs. While Hungary has already lost an estimated $500 million in exports and imports because of present sanctions, Bulgaria has lost a minimum of one billion dollars according to an International Claims Commission and over two billion dollars by the estimates of its own government. I offer the Committee several official Bulgarian statements plus a study of the losses to both Bulgaria and Romania prepared in March by Sofia's Center for the Study of Democracy. Bulgaria's Prime Minister Liuben Berov told me in Sofia that he does not expect that Bulgaria will receive the compensation it should for these losses but still affirmed his government's efforts, exemplary within the region in my opinion, to honor the sanctions. The lifting of all-food related sanctions would provide at least some partial repair to an economy whose private sector has exploded in the past year and deserves all the encouragement we can provide to grow more and to pay taxes on legally recorded activity in the process.
We can say the same for Macedonia's private sector, but should add that it is still more involved in breaking sanctions and pays even less taxes. Immediate U.S. recognition of Macedonia would allow us to take advantage of the presently constructive relations between the governments of Macedonia and Bulgaria and work with them in closing off the major source of petroleum supplies to the Bosnian Serbs. If Serbia wants more relief from sanctions, let its regime invite outside help in closing off its own border to Bosnia. If Greece wants greater security from any potential Turkish threat in the region, let its government also recognize Macedonia and encourage the economic connections that have helped its relationship with Bulgaria.
THE WARS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND THEIR IMPACT ON BULGARIA AND ROMANIA

Andrey Georgiev
Emil Tzenkov

SOFIA, MARCH 1993
5. The Impact of The Sanctions

5.1. General impact

Without being extreme and bearing in mind the many-sidedness of the problem, it can be pointed out that the wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia have had a very negative effect - albeit to differing degrees - on the economies of Bulgaria and Romania. The introduction of sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro by UN Security Council resolution 757 of May 1992 and 787 of November 1992 had also had a negative impact on these countries.

5.1.1. Bulgaria

Because of its geographic location and active economic relations with former Yugoslavia, and particularly with Serbia and Montenegro, Bulgaria found itself among the countries most badly affected by the regime of sanctions. It has found itself effectively cut off from its former Central and West European industrial partners.

However, it is not only a question of direct losses that can be calculated and compensated by the international community. What is more disturbing is the accumulation and intensification of unfavorable processes of various kinds and origins which, taken together, outline dramatic short- and medium-term prospects for the national economy.

Apart from the financial crisis with its well-known parameters, we can also mention: the political conflicts and the possibility of early elections; the lack of clearly pronounced interest by foreign partners and the lack of foreign capital; the disrupted communication system which paralyzes the usual outlets to foreign markets.

Together with the evident difficulties that the wars in former Yugoslavia and the sanctions cause, they also generate problems of broader social and economic scope. Examples of these are the reduction of production, the closing down of enterprises, disorder in the delivery of supplies, growth of inflation and unemployment.

According to unofficial data provided by the Bulgarian institutions, the country's GNP has dropped by 14%, industrial production - by 18%, building and construction - by 19%, transport - by 8%. The unemployment rate is 17% and the rate of inflation is 80%. The foreign debt of the country amounts to 12.9 billion dollars.

Against the background of such considerable difficulties, the inescapable (and additional) sharpening of the economic crisis resulting from the wars and the sanctions undermines the process of Bulgaria's transition to democracy and market economy.
5.1.2. Romania

Given the absence of reliable and detailed statistics, it is rather difficult to come up with an exact estimate of the various aspects of the economic consequences. There can be hardly any doubt, however, that the negative impact of the Yugo crisis blends with Romania's own financial and economic difficulties.

Preliminary data proves that its GNP has decreased by 15%, industrial and agricultural production - respectively by 22% and 9%. The unemployment rate is nearly 9% and the rate of inflation is above 150%. The foreign debt of the country is 2.9 billion dollars.

The dimensions and degree of Romania's losses are very much determined by the fact that during the 80s Yugoslavia was its most stable and indeed strategic economic partner on the Balkans. Although as a rule long-term agreements were not fully accomplished, by the end of the decade the turnover was never less than 300 million dollars per year. Of major importance were the cooperative enterprises and projects - the water power station Zhelezni Vrata I and II, the chemical industry and diesel engine projects.

In the period ranging from the beginning of the conflicts and the introduction of the economic sanctions Romania's export - mostly fuels - to the Yugoslav republics became very active (data on the exact amounts is not available). Part of the Central Europe-Turkey-Middle East freight and passenger traffic was transferred to Romania. This resulted in an increased income flow into the Romanian treasury but it also triggered off some problems at the Romanian border. In 1992 the Romanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian transport authorities launched a series of consultations and took some measures to overcome the difficulties.

Yugoslavia's disintegration appeared as the last link in the chain of the major disruption of markets and Romania's links with Eastern Europe. Although Romania maintained its previous, relatively separate trade relations with the different former Yugoslav republics, Serbia had the largest share in the trade and cooperation with Romania. The figures vary with the various sources - from about 66% to nearly 80%.

5.2. Direct Losses

5.2.1. Bulgaria

Bulgaria joined resolution 757 immediately and proclaimed a strict adherence to the sanctions.

The immediate and the indirect losses to the Bulgarian economy for the last eight months (up to January 1993) after the introduction of sanctions amount to more than 1.4 billion dollars.
The sanctions' negative effect has had an impact on such significant branches of the economy as:

a) Industry, where due to damaged and discontinued links in the production process, the freezing of supplies of raw material and components, and to unsold products, the losses amount to about 800 million dollars;

b) Trade, where due to cancelled agreements, produced but not exported industrial output, annulled barteres, terminated imports and exports under current agreements and delays in the fulfillment of old obligations, the damages inflicted on Bulgarian state and private companies amount to 400 million;

c) Transport, where due to cancelled or extended Balkan Bulgarian Airline flights, disorder in the rail transport of passengers and freight, blockages of navigation along the Danube, road transport and shipping from and to Europe, the immediate losses amount to 80 million dollars;

d) Power production, where disrupted links between Bulgarian and Serbian power systems have caused losses of 22 million dollars;

e) Tourism, where the immediate losses, the penalties for broken contracts and unfulfilled orders only of state tourist companies exceed 5 million dollars;

f) Building and construction, where the negative impact of the sanctions amounts to 5 million dollars.

These figures do not include losses and missed benefits due to the termination of financial operations and transactions and from the hindered Bulgarian telecommunications (which in most cases pass through former Yugoslavia). Not included also are the constantly increasing indirect expenses needed to secure the strict adherence to the sanctions.

At present it is not possible to estimate and classify in a separate category Bulgaria's additional damages resulting from the 787 resolution restrictions on the transit transportation of strategic freight through Serbia and Montenegro. The only rail link between Bulgaria and Macedonia goes through Serbia and Montenegro. The same applies for transport along the Danube - one of the country's most important roads to Europe. Preliminary data proves that losses of this kind probably amount to some 100 million dollars per month.

5.2.2. Romania

Romania kept a negative attitude towards the introduction of sanctions for a relatively long period of time, with the only exception being arms restrictions. Romania considered the first appeals of the European Security and Cooperation Council for restraint from arms deliveries a potential contribution to the termination of the war and announced its readiness to accept the ban on the export of arms and other military supplies.
BALKANS: PROSPECTS FOR ESCALATION AND CONTAINMENT
Janusz Bugajski

General Observations

The war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Western responses to that war, have set some potentially unsettling precedents for the East European and post-Soviet region:

1. They have demonstrated to demagogues and xenophobes how to manufacture ethnic conflicts in order to seize territory and forcibly separate ethnic and religious communities.

2. They have demonstrated that the international community, despite its military and economic potential, simply cannot be relied upon to defend the sovereignty and integrity of unstable states, regardless of whether they are U.N. members, if they fail to meet the criteria commonly referred to as Western "national interests:" strategic location; strategic resources; and possession of strategic weapons.

3. They have demonstrated that in order to ensure survival, states and minority groups facing disputes with neighbors have to prepare to defend themselves by acquiring appropriate weapons, and in some cases undertaking pre-emptive actions against potential or perceived aggressors.

Scenarios Of Escalation

With these observations in mind, one can envision three potential armed conflicts in the Balkans over the next year, aside from the continuing three-sided conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

1. The Second Serb-Croat War:

a. Either a provocative local incident or a sustained offensive by Zagreb or Belgrade could precipitate a renewed conflict over the Krajina region of Croatia, currently occupied by Serb forces. The UN peacekeeping mandate in Krajina was provisionally renewed for three months in June 1993. It remains unclear whether the Croatian side will willingly prolong the UN mission without firmer assurances that several key criteria will be fulfilled: disarming of local militia; return of refugees and displaced people to home villages; and a timetable for the restoration of Croatian authority in the region.

b. Much depends on the military capability of Croatian forces and whether Tudjman calculates that a military offensive at this time will be successful or politically advantageous. Zagreb has so far calculated that Croatian capabilities still do not match those of the Serbs. However, Tudjman is under pressure from hard-liners in the government, party, and military, as well as from an increasingly restless public, to solve the Krajina issue and restore Croatia's territorial integrity. Attention has been distracted during the past year by the Bosnian war, by conflicts
with Muslims, and by some local collaboration with Serbs in Bosnia. This is unlikely to contain after the de facto partition of Bosnia.

c. Serb leaders in Krajina remain intransigent that they will not surrender territory or allow for the restoration of Zagreb's authority in the region. Indeed, a referendum on eventual unification with the quasi-independent Serb Republic in Bosnia-Hercegovina was successfully held in June. Belgrade and Knin held off on announcing unification pending the conclusion of the Bosnian conflict. Although negotiations between Zagreb and Belgrade have taken place over possible territorial exchanges, it remains unclear whether this simply concerns territory in Bosnia and whether any loss of territory in Croatia will be acceptable to the two protagonists. During the past year, Zagreb has been busy rearming and training for a new offensive, while for Serbs the partition of Bosnia and the consolidation of the Serb Republic (in Bosnia) will free substantial numbers of troops to assist the Krajina militias.

2. The South Balkan War:

a. The spark to ignite a wider war could be Kosovo or Macedonia, or both. Armed conflicts in either area could rapidly internationalize the war by embroiling various neighbors either intent on defending co-ethnics or in pursuit of their own territorial ambitions.

b. Several potentially dangerous scenarios could materialize in Kosovo: Milosevic may engineer a military crackdown to rally Serbs behind their most sacred cause and expel thousands of Albanian residents; Milosevic's rivals in the Serbian Radical Party may provoke a crisis in the province to strengthen their position or even unseat Milosevic; radicalization and frustration among the Albanian population could precipitate wide-scale violence regardless of the policies of either the Serb or Albanian leadership.

c. Any armed confrontations in Kosovo would have a devastating effect on neighboring states, particularly on Albania and Macedonia: an exodus of tens of thousands of refugees would seriously strain local resources; border clashes could be expected between Serbian and Albanian troops; irregular Albanian forces from Albania and Macedonia will offer military assistance to Kosovo Albanians; an escalation would then be almost inevitable.

d. Belgrade has tried to keep Macedonia destabilized, with Greek assistance, and eventually reincorporated into a new Yugoslavia. But Serb-Yugoslav forces are unlikely to intervene in the republic through a massive unilateral military intervention. However, alternative scenarios of destabilization are possible: provocation of Albanian-Macedonian confrontations within Macedonia leading to "civil war," outside intervention, government collapse, and eventual partition between two or more neighboring states. This could provoke a wider regional crisis, including bilateral clashes (Albania-Greece, Bulgaria-Serbia), emergence of hostile alliances (Albania and Turkey, Serbia and Greece), intra-NATO confrontations (Greece-Turkey), and a wider Christian-Islamic conflict.

3. The Yugoslav Implosion:

a. Tensions are rising in several parts of the rump Yugoslavia, in addition to Kosovo: Sandzak (with a large Muslim population); Vojvodina (with a large Hungarian and Croatian population), and in the republic of Montenegro. These are exacerbated by economic decline, the mafiaization of the economy, the provocative activities of ultra-nationalist Serb paramilitary units, and the rise of local autonomist or separatist forces.

2
b. In Montenegro even the loyalist regime ensconced by Milosevic in 1989 has shown signs of dissatisfaction and recently formed a coalition government with pro-independence forces. If there is comprehensive economic collapse or if Belgrade moves to restrict Montenegro’s republican status and create some new “federation of Serbian states,” pressures for secession will increase in Montenegro. This in turn could precipitate a violent crackdown by the army and a civil war in the republic.

c. Armed conflict in Serbia itself cannot be discounted as a result of economic collapse, social disorder, violent demonstrations, food riots, and armed confrontations between paramilitaries, army, and police. If Radicals and others hyper-nationalists decide that Milosevic is selling out Krajina to Croatia or calculate that a purge by the Socialists to undercut their operations is imminent, they could manufacture armed conflicts. Splits in the military are possible and even civil war cannot be excluded.

d. There is one additional overarching danger from such developments: facing internal conflict and economic collapse, Milosevic may deliberately engineer an international crisis vis-a-vis Kosovo or Macedonia to recreate the myth of the outside threat for the Serbian population and, by provoking a regional war, gain new international allies.

Containment Strategies

None of the above conflicts are inevitable. Indeed, some may be resolvable (south Balkans); some may be containable (Serb-Croat); and some may actually be desirable (inside Serbia) if they do not provoke a wider regional war. The pursuit of the following policies could mitigate against escalation and reduce potential for armed conflicts:

1. Security:

a. Preparations for a credible and swift military response to any planned international aggression, including the emplacement of NATO troops and military equipment in strategic points (Macedonia, Albania, Italy, Greece, Turkey).

b. A clear statement by the Allies that any cross-border military actions vis-a-vis Macedonia or Albania, on whatever pretext, will trigger an immediate and devastating NATO military response against the Yugoslav military.

2. Political:

a. Initiate a package of steps to reduce tensions in the region, including immediate US recognition of Macedonia in return for full compliance with international embargo against Yugoslavia and a clear statement from Skopje concerning the inviolability of borders; despatch of sizable contingents of human rights monitors, drawn from all CSCE states, to potential flashpoints (Sandzak, Vojvodina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia); the launching of a pre-emptive Balkan peace conference to involve all regional powers and addressing key issues: minority rights, border questions, regional cooperation.

b. Issuing a clear set of conditions to Belgrade, within a specified timetable, to enter into negotiations with Albanian leaders in Kosovo, to restore minority rights and political autonomy; otherwise, moves will be undertaken to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty and the legitimacy of
the unrecognized government.

c. Upgrade program of political assistance to democratic forces in Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia, through party and coalition building, training of young democrats, free media activities.

3. Economic:

a. Increase humanitarian and refugee assistance to neighboring states, as well as credits for infrastructural reconstruction and stimulating market reform, privatization, and free enterprise.

b. Channel economic assistance through democratic forces in Serbia-Montenegro, to increase their visibility and credibility among public during the economic collapse (democratic parties, free trade unions, citizens groups).

c. Announce a set of conditions for easing sanctions on Belgrade or avoiding an even more stringent embargo: full cooperation in apprehending war criminals, disbanding paramilitary formations, recognizing Macedonian independence and territorial integrity, terminating siege of Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities.

4. The Bosnian Precedent:

Having failed to protect innocent civilians and the independence and integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina, a de-facto partition should be hastened to prevent further bloodshed and loss of Muslim territory. This must be accompanied by a comprehensive program of protection and assistance to the rump Bosnian state. The primary losers in the war must become the primary beneficiaries of peace:

a. Provide rump Bosnia with security guarantees and military assistance to protect borders, restore law and order, and punish any Serb or Croat incursions. Belgrade and Zagreb will now become wholly responsible for the military actions of Serb and Croat separatists and surrogates.

b. Commit resources to large-scale economic reconstruction of predominantly Muslim entity in central Bosnia, with Islamic assistance and development aid, including infrastructure, towns, agriculture, and small industry, while for the time being purposively ignoring Serb and Croat-held areas.

c. Launch a substantial program of political assistance to preclude radicalism and build a tolerant, secular, multi-party state in preparation for future elections.

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THE BALKANS: SPILLOVER POSSIBILITIES,
BROADER IMPACT OF THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

Immediate Spillover Potential

Belgrade: Nationalist Serbian politics have become more extreme, with the rise of Vojislav Seselj, the removal of Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic and the severe beating and detention by police of opposition leader Vuk Draskovic (since released). Montenegrin unease over Belgrade’s policies, including decision not to renew CSCE Missions, grows, while non-Serbs and moderates in Vojvodina become uneasy over the course of developments (for Kosovo and Sandzak, see below).

Bosnia-Herzegovina: The potential 3-way carve-up of the republic will be seen as acquiescence to aggression. Continued fighting is the main cause of regional tension, but the end of the conflict could cause paramilitary groups to move activity to, or increase activity in, neighboring areas (Croatia, Vojvodina, Sandzak and Kosovo in particular).

Croatia: Frustration over the inability or unwillingness of UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) to compel Serbs controlling 1/4 of the country to implement the agreed Vance plan -- by surrendering their arms, ceasing to force non-Serbs to leave controlled areas and permitting the hundreds of thousands of displaced to return -- could lead Croatian forces to seek to retake territory by force, or embolden militant Serbs to consolidate territorial gains. Croatia reestablished Maslenica bridge linking north and south coastal areas, following up on attacks initiated in January 1993.

Kosovo: A continued stand-off between Serbia, which denies Kosovo its earlier autonomy and severely represses the majority Albanian population, and Kosovar Albanians, who claim Kosovo to be an independent republic. Violence could arise spontaneously from existing tensions, or as a result of a more aggressive policy to force Albanians to leave. Conflict in Kosovo could cause Albania to become involved, and destabilize neighboring Macedonia with massive refugee flows and Macedonian Albanian involvement in the fighting as well.

Sandzak: Serb paramilitary units, a heavy military presence and discrimination against ethnic Muslims which inhabit this region of Serbia and Montenegro, between Bosnia and Kosovo, have caused considerable societal friction in Sandzak that is directly affected by the war in neighboring regions of Bosnia, to which its population has many ties.

Broader Impact of Yugoslav Conflict

Economic: The conflict has severely disrupted transport links in the Balkans. The need to enforce sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro add to disruptions, breaking regional trade ties with those republics, and enabling sanctions-busting black markets to flourish. Heavy refugee burden of many countries has caused additional difficulties. Conflict comes at a time when most economies in the region were undergoing difficult transformation from controlled to free-market operations. Former Yugoslav republics further hurt by the collapse of the federation’s economic integrity.

Social: Nationalism in one country often plays on nationalism in others. Rewarding nationalist demagogues in the former Yugoslavia could inspire activities of nationalist demagogues nearby and throughout Europe, including the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Those with multi-ethnic populations become increasingly distrustful of minority groups, and perhaps discriminatory as well, while those that have affinities with minorities in neighboring countries become more vocal in raising their concerns and perhaps forming direct links with the minority of concern. Recent Albanian-Greek recriminations cause increased concern in region already torn by ethnic strife.
Correlation of Forces: Conflict has strained existing alliances and European institutions, including the EC, NATO and CSCE, as countries in the region, and powers historically interested in the Balkans base policy-responses on traditional friendships, commonalities and affinities, rather than on Helsinki principles. Globally, presents a picture of a Europe that is uncaring about its Muslim peoples, and fears the establishment of a Muslim state in Europe and links to the Islamic world.

Challenge to UN: The inability of the United Nations to compel implementation of ceasefire and other agreements, and to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief in the former Yugoslavia, the organization's largest peacekeeping and humanitarian challenge to date, brings into question its abilities in a post-Cold War world.

Arguments Given Against Spillover Concerns

Self-Fulfilling Prophecies: Spillover becomes likely only to the extent that concerns about it are constantly raised, spreading fear and exacerbating existing tensions.

Civil War. Not Aggression: What is happening is the result of inter-ethnic feuds and is a civil war in which all are to blame, rather than aggression by one side. As a result, fighting will stop when Serbia controls territory inhabited by Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (and Croatia gains territory in Herzegovina as well).

No U.S. Interests Affected: The United States has no post-Cold War interests in the Balkans, regardless of whether the conflict spreads throughout the region or not. U.S. interests in Europe as a whole need to be reevaluated.

International Responses to Date

UN peacekeeping: About 14,000 peacekeepers in Croatia (Croatian Government reconsidering their presence), 8-9,000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 1,000 in Macedonia (including new U.S. deployments of 300 troops).

Preventive Diplomacy: CSCE Missions of Long-Duration in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina; recently told by Belgrade their presence will not be extended. CSCE Monitoring Mission in Macedonia. CSCE-operated Sanctions Assistance Missions in all countries neighboring Serbia and Montenegro (except Bosnia-Herzegovina). European Community Monitoring Missions in certain former Yugoslav republic and neighboring countries as well.
Announcement of the Joint Action Program on the Conflict in Bosnia

Secretary Christopher, Joint Action Program

Secretary Christopher


Good morning. I am pleased to be here today with my colleagues, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd of the United Kingdom, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev of Russia, Foreign Minister Javier Solana of Spain, and Foreign Minister Alain Juppe of France. I have been asked by my colleagues to make a short summary statement with respect to our deliberations.

We are determined that the international community will act together—based upon shared responsibilities and common purpose—to bring increased pressure to bear on those engaged in the conflict in Bosnia. Each of us—along with our colleagues in other capitals and at the United Nations—has worked hard to find a common approach that will work to stop the killing in Bosnia, to prevent the conflict from spreading, and to bring concerted pressure on the parties to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict. This international pressure will be brought especially to bear on the Bosnian Serbs, who stand solely isolated from the community of civilized nations.

During the last 8 days, we have agreed on a Joint Action Program of further steps which we are announcing today. This Joint Action Program describes the steps we will be pursuing to extinguish this terrible war and achieve a lasting and equitable settlement. We understand, collectively, that there is an urgent need for action. Taken together, the course of action we outline today is designed to directly affect the environment in Bosnia and escalate the pressure on those still fighting so that a political settlement to this crisis—which must be achieved—will be more likely.

Let me now, on behalf of my colleagues, summarize the specific, concrete steps that we have agreed to take and which are presented in the joint document which you have received.

* We will continue our program of humanitarian assistance to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina to save lives, and we will insist that all parties allow this aid to pass without hindrance.

* We will vigorously enforce the tight and tough regime of sanctions that isolate and pressure Serbia and Montenegro. This pressure will be unremitting until the necessary conditions of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions are met, including the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb troops from territories occupied by force.

* Each of us will contribute in our own way—for instance, through monitors, technical assistance, or surveillance—to a joint effort that will ensure that Belgrade's promise to close its border with Bosnia is not a shallow one.

* We will work in the United Nations for early adoption of measures that will implement certain "safe areas" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Each of our nations will make appropriate contributions to securing these "safe areas." In this context, the United States is prepared to meet its commitment to help protect United Nations forces in the event they are attacked and request such action by the United States.

* We will continue to enforce vigorously the no-fly zone established over Bosnia.

* We support the rapid establishment of a war crimes tribunal so that those guilty of atrocities may be brought to justice.
We will remain intensively involved in efforts to achieve a durable, negotiated settlement to this crisis. To the extent that the parties decide to implement mutually agreed provisions of the Vance-Owen agreement, that is something we would encourage.

We are putting Croatia on notice that assistance to the Bosnian-Croatian forces engaged in fighting and in "ethnic cleansing" could result in international sanctions against Croatia.

Grave consequences would arise from violence spreading elsewhere in the Balkans. Accordingly, we support an increased international presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which we will do in consultation with the authorities in Skopje, and we support an increased presence of international monitoring in Kosovo.

In addition, we will keep other options open for new and tougher measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration.

Each of us will work—individually and collectively—to define operational plans to carry out these measures promptly.

It is a testimony to the strength of our alliance and our new partnership with the Russian Federation that we have arrived at this mutual course of action that I am announcing on behalf of my colleagues and myself today. The actions we announce today will save lives, keep the conflict from spreading, and increase pressure for a negotiated settlement.

As our statement says, we are firmly united and committed to prosecuting and pursuing this course of action.

**Joint Action Program**


France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America are profoundly concerned that the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is continuing despite the strenuous efforts of the international community and the Co-Chairs of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which they strongly support, to bring an end to it.

We shall continue to work urgently to help extinguish this terrible war and to achieve a lasting and equitable settlement.

We also have common views on the most productive immediate steps to take. These should lead to implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions as well as the elaboration of further steps.

1. **Humanitarian Assistance.** We will continue providing humanitarian assistance for the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and will insist that all parties allow humanitarian aid to pass without hindrance.

2. **Sanctions.** The economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council against Serbia and Montenegro must be rigorously enforced by all members of the UN until the necessary conditions set out in Security Council Resolution 820, including the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb troops from territories occupied by force, are met for lifting the sanctions.

3. **Sealing Borders.** We note the pledge of the Belgrade authorities to close the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan. We are watching to see if the border closure is effective. Although the primary responsibility for enforcing this step belongs to Belgrade, we can assist, for instance by placing monitors on the borders or providing technical expertise or conducting aerial patrols.

4. **Settlements.** We are deeply concerned about the fighting between Bosnian Croatian and Bosnian Government forces and the related "ethnic cleansing," and we agree that Croatia should be put on notice that assistance to Bosnian Croatian forces engaged in these activities could result in the international community imposing sanctions on Croatia.

5. **Containment.** We will cooperate closely to enhance efforts to contain the conflict and prevent the possibility that it will spill over into neighboring countries. We would regard such a development with the utmost seriousness.

6. **For the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.** It is essential that everyone in the region understands that aggression against the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would have grave consequences. We will support an increase in the international presence there in consultation.
with the authorities in Skopje. The United States is considering a contribution to this effort.

11. Kosovo. We favor an increase in the international monitoring presence in Kosovo. International standards of human rights should be strictly respected in the formerly-autonomous region of Kosovo, although we do not support declarations of independence there.

12. Croatia. The same considerations apply to the Serb-populated areas of Croatia. We will work for the renewal and strengthening of UNPROFOR’s mandate. The Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities should maintain the cease-fire and constructively pursue their dialogue leading to settling practical, economic, and, eventually, political problems between them.

13. Further Measures. We will keep open options for new and tougher measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration.

We five members of the United Nations Security Council are firmly united and firmly committed to taking these immediate steps. We will work closely with the United Nations and the involved regional organizations as we carry out these efforts. ◼
THE CSCE MUST CARRY OUT ITS DECISIONS

1.

The CSCE has, for some time, been seized with the question of Kosova in one way or another. International political leaders and human rights organizations have concluded that in Kosova, the international community must act with the urgency that such an explosive situation warrants. Perhaps due to the hesitancy of stance and action vis-a-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina, the CSCE, in contrast, has at last invested some of its reputation in a new era of prevention of upcoming conflicts. Kosova, as well as Sandjak and Voivodina, has been an area targeted by this preventive diplomacy.

As a result of these policies of preventive diplomacy, Kosova has been a CSCE priority, both overtly and covertly, since the Fourth Meeting of the CSO. The 11th Meeting of the CSO "discussed reports of the grave situation of ethnic Albanians in Kosova and the denial of fundamental freedoms to them..." and accordingly, "entrusted the Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre to dispatch a fact-finding mission in view of determining the military situation in Kosova...".

Later, the 12th Meeting decided to create a task force which "would also prepare recommendations, for consideration by the CSO at its Meeting on 29 June 1992, on the role that further CSCE missions, of either short or long duration, might play in promoting peace, averting violence and restoring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosova, Voivodina and Sandjak, and in support of the efforts of the EC Peace Conference. To help prepare such a recommendation the CSO has decided to send an exploratory mission to the above regions within the next two weeks."

The Helsinki Summit Declaration on the Yugoslav Crisis notes that, "The situation in Kosova remains extremely dangerous and requires immediate preventive action. We call upon the 'Yugoslav' authorities to refrain from further repression and engage in serious dialogue with the representatives in Kosova, in the presence of a third party".

The 13th Meeting of the CSO reiterated that "the exploratory mission...will be dispatched as soon as possible...".

Finally the 16th Meeting, considering the report of the exploratory mission of 9 August 1992, decided to send long term missions to Kosova, Sandjak and Voivodina, with a certain mandate to carry out. Further CSO Meetings decided to the increase the numbers of the CSCE missions.
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Pursuant to preventive efforts, and cognizant of the deteriorating situation on the ground in Kosova, the Stockholm Council Meeting concluded that, "The human rights and fundamental freedoms of the inhabitants of Kosova must be respected. The Ministers called upon all parties, notably the Serbian authorities, to show the necessary restraint. They believed that a United Nations presence in Kosova would be a positive step." This decision, in full conformity with the UN Secretary General's "An Agenda for Peace" on preventive deployment of UN forces, marks, in our view, the culmination of CSCE involvement in Kosova so far.

As compared to other bodies, namely the EC, UN, NATO, and the International Conference on former Yugoslavia, the CSCE has tended to be more active, and not only on paper. The Mission of Long Duration has been seen by the people of Kosova as the only permanent and substantial international presence on the ground. They feel it is the only guarantee to their immediate future, and, as such, the deterrent can easily be imagined.

II.

What, as CSCE’s decisions continue to be flouted, is happening in Kosova today? The Mission has been ordered out, and its presence conditioned upon CSCE’s re-admission of the so-called "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." There is quite clear language in the relevant decision of the 13th meeting of the CSO on suspension, and the memorandum of understanding on the activities of the mission does not go that far. The CSCE, however, has maintained the political momentum by reiterating its resolve not be blackmail by a communist clique in Belgrade and passing a formal decision during its 22nd Meeting to increase of the size of the missions. But, in point of fact, Belgrade called its bluff. The Missions, reduced to the minimum, are still awaiting to pack off and, therefore, have suspended their activities.

On the other hand, the Stockholm decision on the UN presence in Kosova, which we have been advocating as the only way to save the region from a literal catastrophe, has remained a piece of paper, with the UN hardly involved in Kosova at all. The UN Commission on Human Rights, during the last session in Geneva in March 1993, remains the only international body to pass a resolution about Kosova and our grievances.

It occurs, therefore, that in the activities of the CSCE so far, as regards Kosova, there are three tendencies: lack of strong and timely response; delay; and forgetfulness. The CSCE is indeed a 52 member body whose vitality rests upon the willingness or unwillingness of the member states, and, by operating upon the consensus principle, action sometimes becomes difficult to take. It is all too obvious that the CSCE depends upon the YES of the member states. I repeat, the member states. For the time being, the so-called "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" is not a member. Why, therefore, has the CSCE got to ask Belgrade what to do? In my opinion, the whole groundwork of conception is wrong. Serbia has as little to do with Kosova as Albania has. Kosova was part of a federation which no longer exists.
Neither Milosevic, nor the CSCE for that matter, can determine its new status unilaterally. We have insisted that it be done through negotiation, and, indeed, as stipulated in the Helsinki Summit Meeting, in the presence of a third party.

Another point of consideration is the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of a state. On a daily basis, international law and practice are being adapted to post-cold war life, and in this realm, at least in regard to gross and uncorrected violations of human rights, interference in order to enforce their respect and promotion, has become a norm. What would one say to the fact that out of 30 articles of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, Serbia has broken at least 27 with regard to Kosova? Why, then, doesn’t the CSCE have the necessary enforcement power of will to live up to its own decisions? Can such a body mar its reputation and, more importantly, expose peoples to continual threat and repression, only because communism and ultra-nationalism choose to stand in its way? I think it’s high time the record was set straight.

III.

While taking a new decision and enforcing it is still a matter of time in the CSCE, the situation in Kosova continues to deteriorate. Harassment and provocation are threatening daily to spark what we believe to be the next phase of a well-known scenario. Last week, my deputy’s home was stormed and his brother badly beaten in a blitzkrieg of alleged arms searches. Radical extremists threaten to wreak havoc and remind us of what was done in Bosnia while the world condoned their barbarism. The government of Serbia, encouraged by the international community’s proclivity for unfulfilled enforcement threats, is poised to again spread its military ultra-nationalism to yet another part of the Balkans. Sanctions directed at Belgrade weigh heavily upon us as well, but we have supported them so long as they are aimed at curbing aggression. Still, businesses in Kosova are being closed down, bringing an already suffering people to the point of starvation. In the Serbian parliament, proposals are forwarded to eradicate the last remnants of autonomous power which Kosova has always had. In short, the situation in Kosova is going from bad to worse.

Under these circumstances, we have called for the UN forces to come to our aid and to the aid of the region. We have tried, and so far managed, to keep the situation under control. We fear, however, that if tensions are raised, or even maintained at their present high levels, we will not be able to contain the conflict.

International organizations and governments agree that the Serbian Government is punctuated throughout with radical extremists engaging in systematic aggression. The Group of the Seven renewed its call to stop repression in Kosova. Stern action needs to be taken. It is common knowledge that peace can only be achieved by adopting an uncompromising attitude with those who disdain peaceful efforts.
We are determined to pursue our goals peacefully. In this pursuit, and with these intentions, we continue to believe that the CSCE has done a good job in Kosova and that the mandate of the Mission of long duration must be renewed. President Rugova has appealed to the CSCE Chairman-in-office, and I have also sent two letters to the Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Madam Af Ugglas, to the same effect. We feel that, in this case, enforcement must be undertaken. The CSCE and its values must not be let down to be undermined and nullified by obstinacy, be it of whatever origin. Double standards won't save faces or people's lives. Not in Kosova. The situation in Kosova must be declared a threat to international peace and security and relevant action must be undertaken in the meaning of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

In the meantime, while all preventive mechanisms are available, the CSCE must by all means carry out its own decisions, for if there is the will to take them, there should also be the will to implement them.

IV.

The United States of America, in its capacity of the most powerful member of the CSCE, has a lot to say and do in regard to Kosova. While it has already done much, I will not list its accomplishments for fear that I would miss one. The citizens of Kosova appreciate all efforts on our behalf by the U.S. and call upon the Clinton Administration to support our peaceful endeavors and exercise intense pressure upon the criminals who disdain them.

Within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the US must continue to play a leading role in the service of peace and democracy. The "Friends of Bosnia" Group has hitherto played an invaluable role in the decision-making process for this organization. Its impact has given an encouraging message to the people of Kosova, and, in this way, helped keep the tensions from rising any further. The United States should take enforcement action and the initiative of not only making the CSCE and its mechanism more operative, but also undertaking concrete preventive action in that framework and with the same intentions.

Bujar Bukoshi
Prime Minister

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